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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to Air Navigation Service 
Providers (ANSPs) and their suppliers on addressing the objectives of CAP 670 
SW 01 (Reference 1) when deploying COTS equipment.  
This Guidance only addresses the safety assurance required by SW 01 for the 
software content of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment.  It therefore 
does not replace the need to demonstrate satisfaction of the System Safety 
Requirements in the manner required by the ANSP’s Safety Management 
System (SMS) or as specified in the applicable contract for equipment supply. 
1.2 Background 
The CAA published SW 01 in CAP 670 in December 2002. The primary objective 
of SW 01 is to ‘ensure that the risks associated with deploying any software used 
in a safety related ATS system have been reduced to a tolerable level‘. 
Though all parties agree that the principles behind SW 01 are sound (discussed 
in Reference 2), it has become apparent that ANSPs are unclear how to address 
the objectives of SW 01 in a satisfactory manner. Consequently, SRG plans to 
publish a working understanding of the arguments and types of evidence that can 
demonstrate satisfaction of the objectives of SW 01 for: 
a)  a bespoke software development project; 
b)  a significant modification to a legacy system; 
c)  assurance of COTS equipment (e.g. a modem); and 
d) a bespoke equipment development project that uses procured COTS 
software (e.g. a tracking subsystem; a database or an Operating System). 
This Guidance covers point c) in the list ‘Assurance of COTS equipment’. 
This Guidance provides support for ANSPs utilising COTS equipment in 
developing an SW 01 argument in two ways: 
•  Firstly, this Guidance outlines example safety arguments for addressing 
SW 01 for COTS equipment, illustrated using ‘Claim – Argument – Evidence‘ 
(CAE) diagrams (see Annex A1). 
•  Secondly, this Guidance provides ANSPs with a way to determine what 
evidence is necessary to support the SW 01 argument and, from this, the 
activities necessary to develop the evidence. 
This Guidance is based on understandings of industrial practice as it existed in 
2005, and so will be updated and maintained to reflect developments in industrial 
practice and better understanding of arguing COTS compliance with SW 01 (see 
Annex L  Roadmap). 
ANSPs and assessors can use the checking aid in Annex M when preparing the 
submission and verifying whether the submission complies with this guidance. It 
is recommended that ANSPs exceed the guidance given in this document by 
actively seeking to develop a fuller understanding of the best arguments to make 
regarding SW 01 compliance, and by generating more objective and specific 
evidence of satisfaction of each of the five SW 01 sub-objectives. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
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1.3 Scope 
The Guidance is concerned solely with the software assurance required by 
SW  01 and does not address how it is integrated with the system safety 
assurance. 
This Guidance applies specifically to satisfying SW 01 objectives for COTS 
equipment; in so doing, it does not replace the need to fully meet the 
requirements of the ANSP’s own Safety Management System (SMS) with regard 
to software assurance. 
The term ‘COTS equipment’ refers to equipment that is a standard product from a 
manufacturer. Some examples could be: 
•  a network hub/switch/router; and/or 
•  a modem. 
Whilst the arguments in this Guidance preclude its use for more complex COTS 
equipment (such as Voice Switches and Radar Data Processing Systems) during 
stage 1 of the Roadmap (Annex L), its use for such equipment will be permitted. 
However, it is (and will remain) valid to apply this Guidance to equipment that is 
an assembly or COTS modules, provided that: 
1  The architecture of the equipment permits arguments to be made that the 
equipment safety requirements have been validly apportioned to safety 
requirements for the modules within the COTS equipment; and  
2  Detailed design information and evidence are available to support the 
arguments made in the 10
-4 Guidance at the module level.  
This approach is consistent with that discussed in the Rationale (Annex K). In 
future stages of the Roadmap, this Guidance will define constraints for how 
modularisation in 1 above should be argued.  
If there is no software in the equipment, or none of the safety functions of the 
equipment are provided or affected by the software, then there is no need to 
make claims against the objectives in SW 01. However, an argument 
substantiating the claim that SW 01 does not apply is required in the safety case.  
Guidance on some such cases is provided in Reference 4. 
1.4  Limitations on Applicability 
This Guidance is applicable to COTS equipment that meets a set of conditions 
defined in paragraph 2.3 below. Failure to meet these conditions will mean that 
this Guidance cannot be applied and an alternative method of satisfying the 
SW 01 objectives will need to be used. 
This Guidance cannot be applied to software in isolation from the target platform 
on which it is to run, e.g. this Guidance cannot be used to provide assurance of 
an Operating System on its own. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
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This Guidance cannot be used to argue for multiple pieces of equipment unless 
they can be shown to be identical (hardware and software). If they cannot be 
shown to be identical they are assumed to be different, and separate evidence 
will need to be generated for them. It is not uncommon for COTS equipment with 
identical part numbers to have different software versions or hardware 
components. When an argument addresses the installation of multiple identical 
equipments, the supporting test evidence must be valid for each installation. 
1.5 Initial  Reading 
Before using the guidance given here, the reader should be familiar with the 
software safety objectives and the behavioural attributes of a Software Safety 
Requirement defined in SW 01 of CAP 670. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
March 2010     Page 8 
2 Assurance  Approach 
2.1  Overview  
This section provides a description of the steps that an ANSP needs to follow 
when applying this Guidance.  The steps are listed below and each one is 
expanded upon in the following sections: 
Step 1:  Set valid Safety Requirements 
Step 2:  Present Arguments that the Conditions for the use of the Guidance 
are met 
Step 3:  Present Arguments that the SW 01 objectives are satisfied 
Step 4:  Present evidence underpinning the argument 
Step 5:  Claim compliance with this AMC 
2.2  Step 1 - Set Valid Safety Requirements 
The ANSP should follow its SMS to establish Safety Objectives, through a 
process of hazard analysis and risk assessment, and define System Safety 
Requirements to control hazard rates to be tolerable and to specify mitigations. 
The System Safety Requirements are refined according to the system 
architecture, down to the level of the COTS equipment. The System Safety 
Requirements will normally be documented in a ‘Requirements Safety Case’ 
(sometimes referred to as a Safety Case Part 1).   
System Safety Requirements are defined to address hazards and provide 
mitigations. They express the tolerable rate of specific failure modes of a 
function. A complete set of System Safety Requirements for a safety-related 
function addresses each behavioural attribute
1, unless it has been justified as 
having no impact on safety. For example:  
‘The probability that position information is inaccurate (position incorrect by more 
than 2 NM but less than 10 NM) due to the Radar Data Processor (RDP) shall be 
no greater than 6.0 x 10
-4 per hour.
2’ 
The example probability would have been arrived at by: 
•  Using a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), HAZOPS or FMECA process 
to identify potential effects at the level at which their severities are classified 
by the ANSP.  
•  Using the ANSP’s Risk Classification Scheme to identify the broadly 
acceptable rate of occurrence of these potential effects.   
•  Defining and documenting the available mitigations as new or enhanced 
Safety Requirements. 
                                                  
 
1 See ‘Glossary and Definitions’ 
2 This figure is given for illustration only, and should not be assumed to apply to any particular RDP. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
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•  Apportioning the acceptable rate of occurrence across all the sub-systems 
involved in the sequence of event leading to each effect, and by taking 
account of the mitigations. This defines the tolerable rate for the safety 
requirement with respect to each hazard. The hazards and their tolerable 
rates, together are known in Single European Sky legislation as Safety 
Objectives. 
Determining and analysing the available mitigations is one of the most important 
parts of the above process, as it may reduce the integrity required from the 
equipment. The reduced integrity requirement increases the feasibility of 
selecting equipment for which it is possible to successfully generate the required 
safety assurance evidence, and prevents the need to select over-engineered 
equipment to meet an unnecessarily onerous target (see CAP 760 Guidance on 
the Conduct of Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and the Production of 
Safety Cases, Appendix D, Using Event Diagrams for an example of analysing 
the effect of mitigation). 
2.2.1  Form of Safety Requirements 
This Guidance depends on Safety Requirements being stated in a manner such 
that they can be tested, as testing provides the primary evidence to support the 
requirements satisfaction argument. The Safety Requirement must therefore 
precisely identify what must be tested, and specify objective limits beyond which 
the Requirement is not met.  Failure to properly specify Safety Requirements 
affects the practicality of providing assurance that they are met. 
In the past it has been common practise to derive a single Safety Requirement to 
address one ‘corruption’ hazard for several disparate parameters/attributes, for 
example, “The probability of corruption of Radar Data due to the RDP shall be no 
greater than 6.0 x 10
-4 per hour”.  The problem with this form of Requirement is 
that the individual end effects and mitigations can be very different for each 
parameter/attribute, such that the tolerable rate of occurrence for each Safety 
Requirement could be very different.  It is also extremely difficult to test for 
‘corruption’ when it is not properly identified. 
Additionally, the Requirement must properly define limits beyond which the 
parameters would be considered incorrect.  A Requirement such as “The 
probability that position information is inaccurate due to the Radar Data 
Processor (RDP) shall be no greater than 6.0 x 10
-4 per hour” fails to do this.  
Therefore, the various aspects that are commonly referred to incorrectly as 
‘corruption’ could be specified as follows: 
“The probability that position information is inaccurate (position incorrect by 
more than 2 NM but less than 10 NM) due to the Radar Data Processor 
(RDP) shall be no greater than 6.0 x 10
-4 per hour.” 
“The probability that position updates are delayed (by more than 2 seconds) 
due to the Radar Data Processor (RDP) shall be no greater than 4.0 x 10
-3 
per hour.” 
And similarly for incorrect call-sign, altitude, etc. 
It is sometimes necessary to specify several Safety Requirements in respect of 
one behavioural attribute, for example, for different levels of inaccuracy or 
different time periods. In the case of accuracy, small inaccuracies may be unlikely 
to lead to accidents, and large inaccuracies may be incredible, so that large and 
small inaccuracies may be permitted to occur at higher rates than the ‘grey area’ 
in between. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
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2.3  Step 2 – Present Arguments that the Conditions for the use of the Guidance 
are met 
The argument and evidence Requirements of this guidance are only valid 
(provide adequate assurance) under certain circumstances, which are listed 
below. Failure to meet these means that this Guidance cannot be applied and an 
alternative method of satisfying the SW 01 objectives must be used. 
Therefore, in order to use this SW 01 COTS Guidance it is necessary to claim 
that it is valid for the ANSP’s application of COTS equipment by presenting 
arguments that demonstrate that the following are satisfied: 
1  The COTS item is an equipment. This Guidance cannot be applied to 
software in isolation from the target platform on which it is to run, e.g. this 
Guidance cannot be used to provide assurance of an Operating System 
on its own.  A simple statement suffices to satisfy this pre-requisite. 
2  The COTS equipment has an adequate equipment specification. The 
COTS equipment specification must be sufficiently detailed to 
demonstrate implementation of the System Safety Requirements.  
3  The most onerous integrity Requirement on an individual COTS 
equipment is no worse than 1  x  10
-5 occurrences per hour. An 
acceptable argument is that none of the Equipment Safety Requirements 
have an integrity Requirement more onerous than 1 x 10
-5 per hour.  This 
pre-requisite is based upon the limits of credibility of the evidence 
stipulated in this Guidance. 
4  Equipment monitoring Requirements are specified in the associated 
System Safety Case. An acceptable argument (from the time that the 
COTS equipment enters service) is that the in-service monitoring 
Requirements are documented in the associated System Safety Case (in 
accordance with the ANSP’s SMS), and that these requirements monitor 
the behaviour specified in the COTS Equipment Safety Requirements. 
For submissions addressing more than one equipment: 
5  The argument and evidence apply to all equipments. If the submission 
covers more than one deployment of the equipment, then a short 
argument must be provided, addressing the multiple equipment issues in 
Section 1.4.  
Warning: Whilst the following additional conditions must be met in order to use 
this Guidance they do not form part of the argument required above, as they are 
addressed in the argument templates: 
1  The Safety Objectives must have been set at a ‘broadly acceptable’ 
level (see RS 1.1.1). This establishes the acceptability of low confidence, 
as discussed in the rationale Annex K. 
2  The Safety Requirements are all expressed in terms of the COTS 
equipment outputs (see RS 1.1.2). The System Safety Requirements 
have to be derived in accordance with the ANSP’s SMS, and 
allocated/apportioned among the system components to define safety 
requirements for the COTS equipment that are observable.   Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
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3  All the equipment behaviour specified in the COTS Equipment Safety 
Requirements are testable (see RS 1.1.3). The behaviour specified by 
the COTS Equipment Safety Requirements can be stimulated using the 
equipment inputs and the available test facilities. The practicality of this 
limits the complexity of the equipment for which this Guidance can be 
used. 
2.4  Step 3 – Present Arguments that the SW 01 Objectives are Satisfied 
Using the templates provided in this guidance, the ANSP presents the argument 
that the objectives of SW 01 have been met.  This Guidance provides arguments 
(the rationale for which can be found in Annex K of this document), illustrated by 
Claim, Argument and Evidence (CAE) diagrams as follows: 
•  Annex B covers the Arguments and CAEs for software in equipments with 
Safety Requirements no more onerous than 1 x 10
-4, for COTS equipment 
that meet the conditions of paragraph 2.3.   
•  Annexes C to G cover the Arguments and CAEs for software in equipments 
with Safety Requirements no more onerous than 1  x  10
-5, for COTS 
equipment that meet the conditions of paragraph 2.3.   
The safety case documentation must contain the textual arguments from the 
Annexes, but the ANSP may choose whether or not to replicate the CAE 
diagrams.  
ANSPs are free to use an alternative argument representation such as Goal 
Structuring Notation (GSN), provided the argument is completely equivalent. 
The arguments and CAE diagrams shown in this Guidance need minor tailoring 
to cover variations in the evidence actually provided to support the arguments.  
For example, using the COTS Evidence Evaluation Tables (CEET) from Annexes 
I and J allow different combinations of evidence to support the arguments; the 
actual CAEs (or other argument form) used should indicate the actual evidence 
used and provide explicit references. 
Text in italics in the template arguments provides explanations and information 
on the presentation of the argument, and should not be included in an actual 
software safety submission.  
To assist ANSPs with the preparation of their CAEs, editable electronic copies 
are available from: 
Air Traffic Standards 
Safety Regulation Group 
Civil Aviation Authority 
Aviation House 
Gatwick Airport South 
West Sussex 
RH6 0YR 
e-mail: ats.enquiries@caa.co.uk 
Annex A provides more information on CAE construction. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
March 2010     Page 12 
2.5  Step 4 - Present Evidence Underpinning the Argument 
To satisfy the objectives of SW 01 it is not sufficient to merely present or refer to 
the CAE arguments; evidence specific to the use of the equipment is also 
required to support and justify the arguments. 
The ANSP must generate and/or collect the required evidence and embed 
specific references to the evidence in the arguments. The evidence used in the 
argument must be examined when preparing the software safety submission to 
ensure that it is suitable (e.g. relevant, adequate and credible). The ANSP must 
have access to the evidence for its own evaluation, or for SRG audit purposes. 
This Guidance includes COTS Evidence Evaluation Tables (CEETs) that define 
the only permitted options for the evidence that needs to be provided to support 
the given ‘Requirements Satisfaction’ argument.  The CEETs cover ‘Integrity 
Assurance’ and ‘Functional Assurance’ of Safety Requirements separately by 
awarding assurance points for various types of evidence. The arguments for the 
other SW 01 objectives require the same evidence to be provided in all cases, as 
shown in the relevant CAE Annexes (see 2.7 below), so no CEETs are provided 
for these. 
The CEETs include some criteria (Evidence Satisfaction Criteria) that the 
evidence must satisfy to be acceptable. 
Often it is sufficient to just include a reference to the evidence. However, 
sometimes it is necessary to show explicitly how the available evidence supports 
the arguments, particularly in the Requirements Satisfaction argument.  For 
example, in presenting Site Acceptance Testing (SAT) results, it would be 
necessary to show which Safety Requirements have been successfully and fully 
exercised by which SAT tests, e.g. through provision of a matrix linking Safety 
Requirements to the specific SAT tests.  
2.6  Case 1 Equipment with Safety Requirements no more Onerous than 1 x 10
-4 
The 1 x 10
-4 CEETs in Annex I must be used to justify that sufficient evidence is 
presented to satisfy the ‘Requirements Satisfaction’ argument of Annex B.  A 
score of 100 assurance points or more must be accumulated from the Integrity 
Assurance CEET and a further 100 assurance points must be accumulated from 
the Functional Assurance CEET. 
2.7  Case 2 Equipment with Safety Requirements no more Onerous than 1 x 10
-5 
The necessary evidence for equipment with Safety Requirements no more 
onerous than 1 x 10
-5 breaks into three categories: 
•  A fixed set of evidence that must be developed in all cases to support the 
arguments provided (for all five of the SW 01 sub-objectives). 
•  Acceptable combinations of (types of) Requirement Satisfaction evidence 
defined by the CEET from which the ANSP can choose, according to the 
evidence available. 
•  Additional ANSP-defined evidence to support the Requirements Traceability 
and Non-Interference arguments. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
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2.7.1 Fixed  Evidence 
The following must be provided for COTS Equipment Safety Requirements no 
more onerous than 1 x 10
-5: 
•  the ‘Requirements Validity’ argument and evidence shown in Annex C; 
•  the ‘Configuration Consistency’ argument and evidence shown in Annex D; 
•  the ‘Requirements Traceability’ argument shown in Annex F (no fixed 
evidence is required over and above that required for ‘Requirements 
Validity’); and 
•  The ‘Non Interference’ argument shown in Annex G (no mandatory evidence 
is required over and above that required for ‘Requirements Satisfaction’). 
2.7.2  Acceptable Combinations of Evidence Defined using the CEET 
The 1 x 10
-5 CEET in Annex J should be used to justify that sufficient evidence is 
available to support the ‘Requirements Satisfaction’ argument (Annex E). A score 
of 100 points or more should be accumulated from the Integrity Assurance CEET 
and 100 points should be accumulated from the Functional Assurance CEET. 
2.7.3  Additional ANSP-defined Evidence 
This is evidence that SRG cannot pre-define at this stage. The ANSP must 
identify suitable evidence to support certain arguments. Guidance on this is 
provided at applicable points in the template arguments provided in the annexes. 
2.8  Step 5 – Claim Compliance with this AMC 
The ANSP must claim that this guidance has been complied with. This claim 
should provide assurance that the AMC has only been modified in those areas 
permitted by the guidance. This claim should be supplemented with explanations 
of how the ANSP has chosen to present the arguments, e.g. with respect to the 
satisfaction of multiple groups of Safety Requirements.  
ANSPs and assessors can use the checking aid in Annex M to verify compliance 
with this guidance. ANSPs may wish to complete this checking aid and include it 
in the submission to support their claim of compliance. 
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3  Glossary and Definitions 
AMC  Acceptable Means of Compliance 
ANSP  Air Navigation Service Provider 
Architectural 
Unit (AU) 
An AU is defined as, a set of elements protected against 
interference and may be hardware or software. A feature of an AU 
is that it can be assessed independently. 
Behavioural 
attributes 
“Functional properties, Timing properties, Robustness, Reliability, 
Accuracy, Resource usage, Overload tolerance” (as defined in 
SW 01). The relationship between the Behavioural attributes is 
illustrated below: 
Functional Properties
Accuracy
Timing Properties
Overload Tolerance
Resource Usage
Robustness
Integrity
Integrity
Integrity
Integrity
Integrity
Integrity (Reliability)
 
CAA  Civil Aviation Authority 
CAP 670  Civil Aviation Publication 670, Air Traffic Services Safety 
Requirements (Reference 1) 
CAE  Claims- Arguments - Evidence (diagram) 
CC Configuration  Consistency 
SW 01 Sub-Objective E - To ensure that the arguments and 
evidence, for the safety of the software in the system context, are 
from a known executable version of the software and a known set 
of software products, data and descriptions that have been used 
in the production of that version. 
CEET(s)  COTS Evidence Evaluation Tables 
Composable 
relationship 
Composable relationship relates to the demonstration that lower 
level requirements / specifications collectively are fully equivalent 
to a parent requirement / specification. 
COTS  Commercial Off The Shelf [in this guidance it relates to equipment 
that is commercially available with little or no modification]. 
Equipment  Equipment within the scope of this guidance comprises Hardware 
and Software. 
This Guidance applies to software in equipment and cannot be 
used for Hardware components or Software components in 
isolation. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
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Evidence 
Satisfaction 
Criteria 
These are contained in appropriate rows of the CEET, and set 
minimum criteria for evidence to be valid so that the associated 
assurance ‘points’ can be claimed. 
FAT  Factory Acceptance Testing can be used to show that the 
equipment meets the supplier product specification or the 
customer specification or a combination of both. Usually, 
simulated data is required to exercise the full range of the input 
domain. This testing is normally conducted at the manufacturer’s 
premises before the equipment is installed on site. 
FHA Functional  Hazard  Assessment 
FMECA  Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis 
GSN  Goal Structuring Notation 
HAZOPS  HAZard and OPerability Study 
  
Mandatory  Compulsory if this guidance is used by an ANSP as its means of 
compliance with SW 01.  
Integrity  The probability or rate of failure to meet a specification.  
Note:  This is not constrained to complete loss of function but 
addresses all of the attributes of a requirement and the addition of 
unintended behaviour. 
NI Non-Interference 
SW 01 Sub-Objective D - To ensure that functions implemented 
as a result of Software Safety Requirements are not interfered 
with by other functions implemented in the software. 
PSSA  Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
RCS  Risk Classification Scheme 
Requirements 
Safety Case 
That part of a system safety case which provides arguments and 
evidence that the System Safety Requirements therein (or 
referenced) are valid (correct and complete). It may be presented 
as a separate document (sometimes known as a Safety Case 
Part 1) or a specific section of a wider safety case report. 
Roadmap  An outline of the future enhancements required to this guidance 
and supporting material. See Annex L. 
RS Requirements  Satisfaction 
SW 01 Sub-Objective B - To ensure that arguments and evidence 
are available which show that the software satisfies its Safety 
Requirements. 
RT Requirements  Traceability 
SW 01 Sub-Objective C - To ensure that arguments and evidence 
are available which show that all Safety Requirements can be 
traced to the same level of design at which their satisfaction is 
demonstrated. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment  
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RV Requirements  Validity 
SW 01 Sub-Objective A - To ensure that arguments and evidence 
are available which show that the Software Safety Requirements 
correctly state what is necessary and sufficient to achieve 
tolerable safety, in the system context. 
Safety 
Requirement 
In the context of this guidance, a Requirement that defines safety 
behaviour such that a Safety Objective will be satisfied. Each 
Safety Requirement is specified in terms of Behavioural 
Attributes. 
  
Safety Objective  The definition of a hazard together with a qualitative or 
quantitative definition of the maximum frequency or probability at 
which the hazard can occur in order to meet safety targets. 
SAT  Site Acceptance Testing is intended to show that the equipment 
will work in the operational environment and typically meets that 
sub-set of its specification that will be used operationally when 
supplied with data from real interfaces. 
SES  Single European Sky – European legislation EC 549/2004, EC 
550/2004, EC 2096/2005 and EC 482/2008. 
SMS  Safety Management System. Under SES legislation ANSPs must 
have an SMS that is compliant with EC 2096/2005 in  order to be 
Certificated. 
State Space  The State Space is the set of logical states that a component or 
system, normally a software system, can assume.   
SW 01  Regulatory Objectives for Software Safety Assurance in ATS 
Equipment (Reference 1) 
The prime objective of SW 01 is “To ensure that the risks 
associated with deploying any software used in a safety related 
ATS system have been reduced to a tolerable level”. SW 01 does 
not apply to electronic items such as application specific 
integrated circuits, programmable gate arrays, solid-state logic 
controllers or software requirements that can be demonstrated not 
to affect safety (SW 01, Part 1, Paragraph 2.3). 
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ANNEX A ARGUMENT TEMPLATES FOR 1 X 10
-4 AND 1 X 10
-5 REQUIREMENTS 
Paragraph 1 introduces the notation used to illustrate arguments and paragraph 2 
explains the use of the template arguments in Annexes B to G.  
A.1  Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE) Diagrams 
SW 01 requires that arguments and supporting evidence are available to show 
that the risks associated with deploying any software used in a safety related 
ATS system have been reduced to a tolerable level.  
While this argument is documented as text, it is helpful to use diagrams to 
illustrate the structure and relationship of the various parts of the argument. 
There are two points in the process at which diagrams are most useful. The first, 
being the planning stage, where the actual evidence that needs to be produced is 
being defined. The second is when presenting the final safety argument that the 
COTS equipment will be tolerably safe to operate in its operational environment. 
For the author of an argument, such diagrams define distinct parts of the 
argument, helping to keep each part directly relevant to a specific issue. It follows 
that such diagrams may be used to prepare an argument without necessarily 
forming part of the final presentation of the argument. However, for the reader, 
the diagrammatic representation of the argument is very helpful, being the 
equivalent to the contents list of a book, as it shows the elements of the 
argument, where to find them, and the way that they relate to support the top 
most claim. 
Two diagram types are commonly used: Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and 
Claims – Argument - Evidence (CAE). CAE diagrams are used in this document, 
but readers familiar with GSN can easily construct an equivalent GSN structure. 
Examples of GSN are given in CAP 760 (Reference 3).  
The use of ‘Claims – Argument - Evidence’ diagrams in this Guidance document 
is explained here. 
The meaning of the following words in this context is: 
•  Claim - an assertion, the truth of which is subsequently reasoned; 
•  Argument - A course of reasoning aimed at demonstrating truth or falsehood; 
•  Evidence - objects (e.g. maps, records, diagrams, documents or models) that, 
if believed, immediately establish the factual matter to be proved, without the 
need for inferences
2. 
A CAE diagram therefore shows an assertion that something is true: the Claim. 
The claim is substantiated by reasoning that it is true: the Argument. The 
argument is supported by Evidence. An illustrative fictional CAE diagram is 
shown below, followed by an explanation of each element.  
                                                  
 
2 If inferences are required the item is not evidence but in fact a claim that has to be substantiated 
with further argumentation. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Example CAE Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAE diagrams use four types of node, linked by lines that show their supporting 
relationships. Items 1 and 5 represent claims (circles or ellipses). Items 2 and 6 
represent arguments (round-cornered squares or rectangles). Items 3 and 7 
represent items of evidence (squares or rectangles). Item 4 is an ‘other‘ node, 
which does not strictly form part of the argument, but is used for whatever 
purpose is useful – context, annotations, etc. The size and aspect ratio of a node 
is not significant. 
1 
Title of ‘top’ claim 
(0 words) 
7 
More evidence
(0 words) 
2 
Title of argument for ‘top’ 
claim 
(0 words) 
5 
Another Claim 
(0 words) 
6 
Another argument 
(0 words) 
3 
Evidence Title 
(0 words) 
4 
‘Other’ Title 
(0 words) Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Each node represents a fragment of a complete argument. The important 
features of each node are: 
•  The node’s type – claim, argument, evidence or ‘other’. 
•  The node’s relationship to other nodes – see below. 
•  The node’s title, as shown on the diagram – note that this is just a title which 
is usually just a summary of the information it represents. 
•  The relationship between the node symbol and the fragment of the argument.  
The overall argument starts with the desired top safety claim. Each claim must be 
supported by one or more arguments (usually only one). Argument nodes must 
be supported by at least one (sub-) claim or evidence node
3. Evidence nodes are 
not supported, as they represent items that exist, and cannot directly support a 
claim without an intervening argument. The bottom-most nodes are therefore 
always evidence nodes. A (sub-) claim may support more than one argument 
and, similarly, an item of evidence may be used by more than one argument to 
show the same or different things. 
There is no definitive convention for titling argument nodes, some approaches 
being: 
•  Repeat the claim verbatim; 
•  Use no words, just a reference to the full argument (because a summary may 
be misleading); 
•  Attempt to summarise the argument, in a bottom-up manner; 
•  Attempt to provide a continuing narrative from the claim, providing the reason 
that the claim is true, for example starting “As …”. 
It is recommended that a single approach is adopted consistently throughout an 
overall argument.  In this document, the last of these is used. 
For ANSPs that do not have a proprietary safety argument tool, the CAE 
diagrams in this Guidance have been re-created using standard office software. 
Nodes usually have a numeric reference (1 to 7 are used above), which can be 
used as the section number of the document containing the relevant fragment of 
the argument, or a document reference for an evidence item.  
The nodes may be coloured to reinforce the difference in shape: in this 
document, claim nodes are blue, argument nodes are green, evidence nodes are 
magenta, and ‘other’ nodes are grey. 
                                                  
 
3 In theory, an argument could comprise self-evident assertion, assumptions etc., which could be 
represented as unsupported sub-claims, but in practice these are subsumed directly into the text in 
the argument node. Therefore, the theoretical case where there is an unsupported argument node 
does not occur in practice. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
Annex A Argument Templates for 1 x 10
-4 and 1 x 10
-5 Requirements  
 
March 2010     Page 21 
Where a proprietary tool is used that stores the diagram and all the text of the 
claims, arguments and evidence, there is a tendency to think of the diagram as 
the safety argument. The diagram on its own is not sufficient; all the fragments of 
the argument are required.  Moreover, all evidence items referenced in the 
argument form an integral part of the safety argument. 
A.2  Argument Templates Annexes B to G 
A.2.1 Templates 
Annex B provides a template of an acceptable argument that addresses the 
objectives of SW 01 for equipment with Safety Requirements no more onerous 
than 1x10
-4.  
Annexes C to G are a template of an acceptable argument that addresses the 
objectives of SW 01 for equipment with Safety Requirements no more onerous 
than 1 x 10
-5. 
The diagrams in each Annex represent a single argument structure, divided into 
manageable portions for presentation purposes. As this division is for 
convenience, any other partitioning of the overall structure that an ANSP might 
choose to adopt would be equally valid. Where a claim is developed further in a 
child diagram, the reference number of the child diagram is given in the claim 
node. Each CAE diagram illustrates a fragment of the argument and is followed 
by the full argument text. 
A.2.2  Using the Templates 
The ANSP must take responsibility for its own safety case, whether the material 
originates from this Guidance or otherwise.  It is important that the ANSP ensures 
that it only uses arguments from this Guidance that are valid for the COTS 
equipment.  The ANSP may find that it is necessary to add further arguments and 
evidence to create a complete and correct argument. 
Normal text in Annexes B to G is intended to be invariant, and so is written for 
direct inclusion in the ANSP’s software safety arguments.  Footnotes and text in 
italics provides information on the presentation of the argument, and should not 
be included in an actual software safety submission.  
As a template, the diagrams and arguments include the complete range of 
assurance evidence options permitted by the CEET. These diagrams may 
therefore require modification according to the actual evidence called upon, 
which will vary depending on the ANSP circumstances.  
Where the word [REF] is found in the supporting argument text, users are 
required to replace it with a discrete and precise reference to the documentary 
evidence being called for to support the argument.  This evidence may need to 
be examined during an audit. 
A.2.3 Referencing  System 
In the Claims – Argument – Evidence (CAE) diagram diagrams in this guidance, 
the claim and argument nodes include a reference (e.g. ‘RS1.2’). This identifies 
the paragraph where the full argument is provided (the diagram is merely a 
summary). Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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A.2.4  Comparison of 10
-4 Argument with 10
-5 Argument 
The 10
-4 argument is a shortened version of the 10
-5 argument.  This is because 
the 10
-4 argument addresses the assurance of the COTS equipment safety at the 
equipment boundary and the 10
-5 argument may require knowledge of the 
software architecture of the COTS equipment. Consequently, only the ‘sufficient 
assurance can be gained’ part of the argument (RS1.1) and the ‘Safety 
Requirements are met’ part (RS1.2) from the 10
-5 argument are required in 
the 10
-4 argument.  These are the same in both arguments, at the current 
Roadmap stage, as the two CEETs (Annexes I and J) invoke the same evidence. 
However, the assurance points available are different. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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ANNEX B ARGUMENT DIAGRAM TEMPLATE FOR 1 X 10
-4 REQUIREMENTS 
 
SW1  The Safety Objective of SW 01 is satisfied 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety Requirements have been derived using a risk identification and mitigation 
process under the ANSP’s Safety Management System. For the purposes of 
SW 01 compliance, the validity of these Safety Requirements does not require 
justification at this Roadmap position. 
The System Safety Assessment has identified valid behavioural Safety 
Requirements [REF to Requirements Safety Case] at the equipment level
4,  5, 
hence the Requirements Validity sub-objective need not be argued here because 
we are treating the equipment as a black box. Similarly, the Safety Requirements 
do not need to be traced into the software, so the SW 01 sub-objective for 
Requirements Traceability does not need to be argued.  
                                                  
 
4 Valid Safety Requirements are as defined in the ‘Glossary and Definitions’, and satisfy the 
apportionment Requirement of the Rationale in Annex K.3 of this document. See Section 2.3. 
5 This assumes that the System Safety Assessment has addressed all of the behaviour exhibited by 
the COTS Equipment including un-specified behaviour. 
 
SW1 
As the system safety process negates the need for the 
satisfaction of specific software objectives other than 
Requirements Satisfaction, and the COTS equipment 
behavioural Safety Requirements are satisfied 
 
SW1 
The five Sub-Objectives 
of SW 01 are satisfied 
RS1 
The COTS equipment 
behavioural Safety 
Requirements are 
satisfied 
Requirements Safety 
Case Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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As the evidence came from an unchanged off the shelf purchased equipment all 
of the evidence generated relates to the version of software to be put into 
operation and hence no Configuration Consistency argument is required
6.  
Satisfaction of the requirements shows that the software within the equipment 
has not interfered with its safety functions over the full range of operations and for 
sufficient time. Consequently, the Non-Interference sub-objective is not argued 
separately because the argument that the software Safety Requirements are 
satisfied includes an argument that sufficient state space has been exercised. 
Therefore, the only sub-objective that requires arguing is Requirements 
Satisfaction (Claim RS1). 
 
RS1  The COTS equipment behavioural Safety Requirements are satisfied 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequate evidence of behaviour can be gained at the COTS equipment level 
(Claim RS1.1), and there is adequate evidence that the Safety Requirements are 
met at the COTS equipment level (Claim RS1.2).  Optional text: , supplemented 
by some knowledge of internal design features. 
Therefore, there is adequate evidence that the COTS equipment behavioural 
Safety Requirements are satisfied.  
 
                                                  
 
6 Unless two equipments can be shown to be identical (hardware and software) then they are 
assumed to be different and separate evidence will need to be generated for both. It is not uncommon 
for COTS equipment with identical part numbers to have different software versions or hardware 
components. 
RS1 
The COTS equipment 
behavioural Safety 
Requirements are satisfied 
RS1 
As adequate evidence can be 
gained, and has been gained, that 
the behavioural Safety 
Requirements are met at the 
equipment level 
RS1.1 
Adequate evidence of 
behaviour can be gained 
at the COTS equipment 
level
RS1.2 
There is adequate 
evidence that the Safety 
Requirements are met at 
the equipment level Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.1    Adequate evidence of behaviour can be gained at the COTS 
equipment level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RS1.1.2 
The Safety 
Requirements 
are observable 
at the equipment 
boundary 
RS1.1.3 
All output states that 
need to be tested can be 
stimulated by specified 
action at the input 
domain 
RS1.1.4 
Sufficient state space 
can be exercised 
RS1.1.1 
As the safety objectives 
were set at a ‘broadly 
acceptable’ level of risk 
and the resulting Safety 
Requirements are not 
more onerous than 
1x10
-4 
RS1.1.2
As the Safety 
Requirements have 
been expressed in 
terms of observable 
equipment outputs 
RS1.1.4 
As the equipment is 
sufficiently simple 
Requirements 
Safety Case
COTS 
Evidence 
Evaluation 
Tables 
(CEET I.1) 
Soak Test Script 
and/ or Supplier 
Test Script 
Soak Test 
Results and/ or 
Supplier Test 
Results 
RS1.1 
As low confidence is sufficient 
and can be achieved by 
examining the behaviour of the 
software from the equipment 
boundary
Initial Monitoring 
Instructions 
RS1.1.1 
The integrity 
Requirements of this 
equipment meet the 
integrity and risk 
criteria  
RS1.1 
Adequate evidence of 
behaviour can be gained 
at the COTS equipment 
level
RS 1.1.3 
As a competent 
person was able to 
produce test scripts 
Equipment 
Specification
Guidance for Producing 
SW 01 Safety Arguments 
For COTS Equipment 
Test Scripts
Competency 
Evaluation Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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It is possible to stimulate the equipment’s inputs and observe the required safety 
behaviour at its outputs (Claim RS1.1.2 and Claim RS1.1.3). When the software 
state space is sufficiently small (Claim RS1.1.4), the CAA ‘Guidance for 
Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment’ authorises the 
assumption that testing at equipment level can cover sufficient of this state space 
to demonstrate Requirement Satisfaction, with a low level of confidence, for 
integrity Requirements no worse than 1  x  10
-4, without further supporting 
evidence.  
A low level of confidence of Requirement Satisfaction is acceptable when system 
Safety Requirements are set to achieve ‘broadly acceptable’ levels of risk.  The 
integrity Requirements of this equipment meet the integrity and risk criteria (Claim 
RS1.1.1).  
Under these circumstances, equipment test results adequately demonstrate 
equipment behaviour. 
RS1.1.1 The integrity Requirements of this equipment meet the integrity and 
risk criteria   
The Safety Requirements are not more onerous than 1  x  10
-4  [REF to 
Requirements Safety Case], and are valid because they are derived from Safety 
Objectives that were set at a ‘broadly acceptable’ level of risk [REF to 
Requirements Safety Case], such that low confidence is required thus meeting 
the integrity and risk criteria set in this guidance (see the Rationale in Annex K of 
the CAA ‘Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS 
Equipment’). 
RS1.1.2 The Safety Requirements are observable at the equipment 
boundary  
The required safety behaviour (COTS Equipment Safety Requirements) is 
observable at the equipment boundary because they are expressed in terms of 
effects at the output of the equipment. This can be seen by inspection of the 
COTS Equipment Safety Requirements in the Requirements Safety Case [REF to 
Requirements Safety Case]. 
RS1.1.3 All output states that need to be tested can be stimulated by 
specified action at the input domain  
All output states that need to be tested can be stimulated by specified action at 
the input domain. This was demonstrated by the successful creation of the test 
scripts by a person familiar with the application, using the equipment specification 
to create tests that, for each Safety Requirement, adequately cover the output 
range, without identifying any aspects of the Requirements as being un-testable. 
The Test Scripts [REF to Test Scripts] show a comprehensive set of tests for 
each Safety Requirement [REF to Requirements Safety Case], and were 
prepared by [NAME of competent person], who is considered competent [REF to 
Competency Evaluation] to prepare test scripts and to have adequate knowledge 
of the equipment [REF to Equipment Specification] and application. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.1.4 Sufficient state space can be exercised  
Although the input and output domains of the equipment are known sufficiently to 
test the full range of outputs, the internal variable domain of the software is not 
known. Without knowledge of the complexity of the implementation, this Safety 
Argument cannot provide assurance that sufficient state space can be exercised. 
However, due to the mitigations provided by setting Requirements at a broadly 
acceptable level of risk (such that low confidence of Requirement Satisfaction is 
required), and the extra initial vigilance on entry to service [REF to Initial 
Monitoring Instructions], SRG authorises the assumption that meeting the soak 
testing Requirements in the CEET (Annex I of ‘Guidance for Producing SW 01 
Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment’) provides adequate coverage of the 
state space for simple equipment
7. 
The equipment is sufficiently simple and (either or both of the following) soak 
testing and/ or supplier test evidence meets the evidence criteria in the CEET 
[REF to Soak Test Script and Soak Test Results and/ or Supplier Test Scripts 
and Supplier Test Results]. 
The ‘Initial Monitoring Instructions’ should attempt to detect and record any 
behaviour that is not specified in the COTS Equipment Specification. 
 
                                                  
 
7 The claim that “Sufficient state space can be exercised” is far more credible for a ‘smaller’, single 
purpose equipment with bespoke platform like a radio than for a ‘larger’ sub-system based on a more 
general purpose computing platform.  It would not be a credible claim for a cluster of PCs or similar. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.2 There is adequate evidence that the Safety Requirements are met at 
the equipment level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the ‘Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment’, 
SRG has provided a scheme for determining the level of assurance provided by 
Requirement Satisfaction evidence. The COTS Evidence Evaluation Table 
defines criteria for the evidence and assurance points that can be claimed for that 
evidence.  The Guidance requires that the total of the assurance points must 
exceed a defined minimum level.   
[ANSP] agrees that the assurance provided by evaluation of the COTS 
equipment, using this scheme, is sufficient
8. 
                                                  
 
8 This is effectively a formal statement by the ANSP that the argument is not invalidated by contrary 
evidence or other circumstances. 
RS1.2 
There is adequate evidence 
that the Safety Requirements 
are met at the equipment 
level 
RS1.2 
As the arguments and evidence 
for subclaims RS1.2.1 to RS1.2.4 
combine to provide enough 
assurance points from CEET I.1 
to I.5.
Multiple 
arguments will be 
required for 
multiple Safety 
Requirements 
COTS Evidence 
Evaluation Tables 
(CEET I.1 to I.5)
RS1.2.1 
Sufficient test evidence 
has been accumulated to 
support the argument that 
the Safety Requirements 
are met at the equipment 
level 
RS1.2.2 
Sufficient field service 
evidence has been 
accumulated to support the 
argument that the Safety 
Requirements are met at the 
equipment level 
RS1.2.3 
Sufficient evidence of supplier 
reputation has been accumulated 
to support the argument that the 
Safety Requirements are met at 
the equipment level 
RS1.2.4 
Sufficient design evidence has 
been accumulated to support the 
argument that the Safety 
Requirements are met at the 
equipment level Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
Annex B Argument Diagram Template for 1 x 10
-4 Requirements 
 
March 2010     Page 29 
Sufficient functional and integrity evidence has been accumulated that shows that 
the Safety Requirements are met at the equipment level. This evidence 
comprises: Test; Field Service; Supplier reputation and Design evidence [delete 
as applicable]. 
For each type of evidence, the claim for the number of ‘functional points’ and 
‘integrity points’ is justified in the arguments that follow, in accordance with the 
CEET.  The points claimed are:  
•  100 functional points
9 from test evidence;  
•  It integrity points from test evidence (see RS1.2.1); 
•  If integrity points from field service evidence (see RS1.2.2); 
•  Is integrity points from supplier reputation evidence (see RS1.2.3);  
•  Id integrity points from design evidence (see RS1.2.4). 
The evidence is judged to be sufficient because the CEET was used to determine 
that the minimum of 100 functional and 100 (It + If + Is + Id) integrity points has 
been achieved.   
Notes regarding multiple arguments for multiple Safety Requirements 
It is important that the evidence is  credible for each Safety Requirement. The 
arguments should show this as clearly as possible to ease review and audit. For 
example, if a single Safety Requirement were selected, then the relevant tests 
and test records for that Requirement must be identifiable, and it is best to 
include such traceability in the Safety Argument.  The CEET includes some 
Evidence Satisfaction Criteria that are intended to address this. 
It may not be possible (valid) to claim the same level of assurance for all Safety 
Requirements from a particular source of evidence. For example, even though 
the CEET requires a similar environment, the available field-service evidence 
may not have exercised certain features of a product relevant to some Safety 
Requirements. For those Safety Requirements, alternative evidence must be 
used and therefore other variants of the arguments used. 
Different arguments may be presented for groups of Safety Requirements, 
according to the available evidence from test, field service, supplier reputation 
and design. These arguments could have common elements, for example the 
claim and argument for FAT and SAT, but might refer to different evidence from 
field service experience, supplier testing and design evidence. 
Diagrammatically, there would be one sub-CAE diagram from this point 
downwards for each group of Safety Requirements. 
In practice, at this stage of the Roadmap, the CEET points scheme means that 
there will be few cases where there are such variations in the points claimed from 
each evidence type. 
                                                  
 
9 No other result is possible in a complete argument. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.2.1   Test Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of the available evidence with the CEET I.1 and I.5 shows that a 
total of It integrity points and 100 functional points can be claimed. This is made 
up as follows: 
All Safety Requirements are shown to have been addressed by tests either in 
FAT or in SAT [REF to Test Traceability Matrix], meeting the evidence criteria in 
the CEET I.5.  Therefore, 100 functional points are claimed. 
RS1.2.1 
As sufficient functional and integrity 
assurance points have been 
accumulated from Test evidence  
FAT Test Script 
(CEET I.1 & I.5) 
FAT Test Results 
(CEET I.1 & I.5) 
SAT Test Script 
(CEET I.1 & I.5) 
SAT Test Results
(CEET I.1 & I.5) 
Supplier System 
Level Test Results
(CEET I.1) 
Supplier System 
Level Test Script 
(CEET I.1) 
Evidence of user 
training taking place 
(CEET I.1) 
Soak Test Results
(CEET I.1) 
Soak Test Scripts
(CEET I.1) 
COTS Evidence 
Evaluation Tables 
(CEET I.1 & I.5) 
Test Traceability Matrix 
(CEET I.1 & I.5) 
RS1.2.1 
Sufficient test evidence has been 
accumulated to support the 
argument that the Safety 
Requirements are met at the 
equipment level Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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FAT has been conducted, and met the evidence criteria in the CEET I.1 [REF to 
FAT Test Script and FAT Test Results]. No violations of the Safety Requirements 
were observed during the tests [REF to FAT Test Results]. Therefore x integrity 
points
10 are claimed.  
SAT has been conducted, and met the evidence criteria in the CEET I.1 [REF to 
SAT Test Script and SAT Test Results]. No violations of the Safety Requirements 
were observed during the tests [REF to SAT Test Results]. Therefore x integrity 
points are claimed.  
ANSP Soak Testing (y weeks
11) has been conducted, and met the evidence 
criteria in the CEET I.1 [REF to Soak Test Scripts and Soak Test Results]. No 
violations of the Safety Requirements were observed during the tests [REF to 
Soak Test Results]. Therefore x integrity points are claimed. 
User Training (y weeks) has been conducted, and met the evidence criteria in 
the CEET I.1 [REF to Evidence of user training taking place]. No violations of the 
Safety Requirements were observed during the training (no counter-evidence 
available). Therefore x integrity points are claimed. 
y system-months of Supplier testing (System Level) have been conducted, and 
met the evidence criteria in the CEET I.1 [REF to Supplier System Level Test 
Script and Supplier System Level Test Results]. No violations of the Safety 
Requirements were observed during the tests [REF to Supplier System Level 
Test Results]. Therefore x integrity points are claimed. 
[If applicable] The integrity points total exceeds the maximum claimable (CEET 
I.1) for testing of 1 x 10
-4 requirements, and so this is capped at 90. 
In each case, this argument has assumed that the 'Evidence Satisfaction Criteria' 
in the  CEET have been met for each evidence item. In a real argument this 
should be briefly argued, otherwise each reviewer will need to access the 
evidence to determine whether the criteria are met.  Note that SRG may require 
the supply of any evidence item used. 
                                                  
 
10 Here, x is used throughout to denote a number of points derived from the CEET, according to the 
evidence provided. 
11 Here, y is used throughout to denote a period of time specific to the COTS in question. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.2.2  Field Service Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of the available evidence with CEET I.2 shows that If integrity points 
can be claimed. 
The argument that the field service experience meets the evidence criteria in 
CEET I.2 is as follows. 
The  COTS equipment specific argument that needs to be inserted here to 
claim field service experience will depend on the data held. Having selected a 
matching Field Service experience scenario from CEET I.2 (e.g. ‘Same system 
on a similar platform’), the argument must show that the available field service 
experience matches that scenario, and justify that the evidence available meets 
the Evidence Satisfaction Criteria given in that row of CEET I.2. 
As an example, the argument that the field service for which evidence is held 
meets the evidence criteria in the CEET for field service experience 'of the same 
system on the same platform' could be similar to the following: 
Field service experience is being claimed from an equipment that has been 
operating for 1.5 years at <location>. The equipment is identical to that being 
justified in this example [REFs to equipment build statement in Doc Y and build 
statement for operational equipment], and therefore qualifies as ‘the same 
system on the same platform’ in the CEET. It also meets the criterion for a similar 
environment. Analysing  the occurrences reported by users [REF to written 
statement of observed failures in Doc Y], it was found that none contravene the 
current Safety Requirements, indicating that the future rates are expected to be 
less than those stipulated for each Safety Requirement. 
RS1.2.2 
Sufficient field service evidence has been 
accumulated to support the argument 
that the Safety Requirements are met at 
the equipment level 
RS1.2.2 
As sufficient integrity 
assurance points have been 
accumulated from Field 
Service evidence 
Equipment-specific 
evidence that satisfies the 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria for the selected 
scenario in CEET I.2 
 
 
COTS Evidence Evaluation 
Table (CEET) I.2 
COTS 
equipment 
specific 
argument 
required Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.2.3   Supplier Reputation Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of the available evidence with CEET I.3 shows that Is integrity points 
can be claimed. 
The argument that the supplier experience and expertise evidence meets the 
evidence criteria in CEET I.3 is as follows. 
The  COTS equipment specific argument that needs to be inserted here to 
claim supplier reputation will depend on the data available. Having selected a 
matching supplier reputation scenario from CEET I.3 (e.g. 'Supplier has 
experience of deploying systems of the same type into the ATC market'), the 
argument must show that the available evidence matches that scenario, and 
justify that it meets the Evidence Satisfaction Criteria given in that row of CEET 
I.3. 
As an example, the argument that the supplier experience and expertise 
evidence meets the evidence criteria in CEET I.3 for ‘Supplier has experience of 
deploying systems of the same type into the ATC market’ could be similar to the 
following: 
RS1.2.3
Sufficient evidence of supplier 
reputation has been accumulated to 
support the argument that the 
Safety Requirements are met at the 
equipment level 
RS1.2.3 
As sufficient integrity assurance points 
have been accumulated from Supplier 
Reputation evidence 
Equipment-specific 
evidence that satisfies the 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria for the selected 
scenario in CEET I.3 
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The supplier has been producing similar types of system for greater than 15 
years, is experienced in the ATC domain and has delivered systems successfully 
to other ANSPs and can provide evidence to support the success at these other 
units. The service history records [REF to service history records] show service 
records for all equipment of this type. Analysing these records, it was found that 
no faults occurred that contravene the current Safety Requirements, indicating 
that the future rates are expected to be less than those stipulated for each Safety 
Requirement. Additionally, the supplier has provided a statement regarding its 
experience in the market [REF to supplier experience statement], which shows 
successful installations at 30 locations over the last 17 years, with no instances of 
significant faults being reported. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
Annex B Argument Diagram Template for 1 x 10
-4 Requirements 
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RS1.2.4   Evidence of Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of the available design evidence with CEET I.4 shows that Id integrity 
points can be claimed.  
The argument that the Design evidence meets the evidence criteria in CEET I.4 
is as follows. 
The  COTS equipment specific argument that needs to be inserted here to 
claim design evidence will depend on the data available. Having selected a 
matching design evidence scenario from CEET I.4 (e.g. 'Knowledge of internal 
design features which have been put in place to limit the possibility of unwanted 
system action’'), the argument must show that the available evidence matches 
that scenario, and justify that it meets the Evidence Satisfaction Criteria given in 
that row of CEET I.4. 
 
RS1.2.4 
As sufficient integrity assurance points have 
been accumulated from Design evidence 
RS1.2.4 
Sufficient design evidence has been 
accumulated to support the argument 
that the Safety Requirements are met at 
the equipment level 
Equipment-specific 
evidence that satisfies the 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria for the selected 
scenario in CEET I.4 
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ANNEX C REQUIREMENTS VALIDITY ARGUMENT DIAGRAM TEMPLATE FOR 1 X 10
-5 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
RV1  The COTS equipment behavioural Safety Requirements correctly 
state what is necessary and sufficient to achieve tolerable safety, in 
the system context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety Requirements have been derived using a risk identification and mitigation 
process under the ANSP’s Safety Management System. For the purposes of 
SW 01 compliance, the validity of these Safety Requirements does not require 
justification at this Roadmap position. 
The system safety analysis identified Safety Requirements [REF to Requirements 
Safety Case] at the equipment level
12.  
                                                  
 
12 Valid safety requirements are as defined in the ‘Glossary and Definitions’, and satisfy the 
apportionment requirement of the Rationale in Annex K.3 of this document. 
RV1 
The COTS equipment behavioural Safety 
Requirements correctly state what is 
necessary and sufficient to achieve 
tolerable safety, in the system context 
RV1.1 
The COTS equipment 
behaviour required by the 
COTS equipment behavioural 
safety requirements has been 
identified  
RV1.2 
The software specification items that 
support the COTS equipment 
specification have been identified 
 
This part of the argument is 
only used when RS 1.2.4 
relies on software level 
knowledge of internal design 
features  
RV1 
As they are complete, well formed, 
and consistent with the specified 
COTS equipment behaviour 
 
Equipment Safety 
Requirement Analysis 
Requirements 
Safety Case 
Equipment 
Specification 
Safety Analysis of 
Equipment Specification 
System Safety 
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Analysis of the equipment level safety requirements [REF to Equipment Safety 
Requirement Analysis] identified the COTS equipment behavioural Safety 
Requirements, and confirmed that they are correctly formed
13.  
All specified behaviour of the COTS equipment [REF to Equipment Specification] 
was analysed
14 [REF to Safety Analysis of Equipment Specification
15] to identify 
behaviour required by the COTS equipment behavioural Safety Requirements 
(Claim RV1.1), and to determine whether further safety requirements (known as 
derived safety requirements) were necessary to address unrequired behaviour 
[REF to all identified derived Safety Requirements, usually contained in 
Equipment Safety Requirement Analysis].  These derived Safety Requirements 
were apportioned, in the System Safety Analyses [REF to System Safety 
Analysis], to appropriate system components
16. 
Therefore, the COTS equipment behavioural Safety Requirements correctly state 
what is necessary and sufficient to achieve tolerable safety, in the system 
context. 
For 10
-5 it may not be possible to sufficiently demonstrate satisfaction of 
the apportioned safety requirements at equipment level. This means 
that evidence about the software within the COTS equipment must be 
used to provide sufficient assurance of requirement satisfaction, so the 
software safety requirements must be identified (by apportionment from 
the equipment safety requirements). Under these circumstances, it is 
also necessary to analyse all behaviour of the software (at the same 
level as the safety requirements), to identify any further ‘derived’ safety 
requirements from unrequired software behaviour. 
The previous paragraph considers the issues in principle.  However, at 
the present Roadmap position, the constraints of this Guidance are not 
so onerous.  The only case when it is necessary to argue Requirement 
Validity at software level is when the Requirement Satisfaction 
argument claims integrity points for “knowledge of internal design 
features”. Moreover, this Guidance only stipulates identification (not 
apportionment of safety requirements) of the software functionality that 
relates to the equipment safety requirements, so that the relevance of 
designed-in safety features can be demonstrated. 
Text for the option when the Requirement Satisfaction argument claims integrity 
points for “knowledge of internal design features”:  The software specification 
items that support the COTS equipment behavioural Safety Requirements have 
been identified (Claim RV1.2). 
                                                  
 
13 See Section 2.2 and ‘Glossary and Definitions’ for behavioural attributes. 
14 This guidance does not require the quality of the product specification to be argued at this stage of 
the roadmap, as the analysis could not be completed if the product specification does not provide 
sufficient detail. This guidance cannot be used if the analysis is incomplete. 
15 This document may be integrated with the Equipment Safety Requirement Analysis. 
16 These derived safety requirements may be allocated to parts of the system other than the COTS 
equipment, and have to be addressed as part of further safety arguments supporting putting the 
COTS equipment into service. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
Annex C Requirements Validity Argument Diagram Template for 1 x 10
-5 Requirements  
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RV1.1 The COTS equipment behaviour required by the COTS equipment 
behavioural safety requirements has been identified  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each COTS equipment behavioural safety requirement (as identified by the 
analysis of the equipment level safety requirements [REF to Equipment Safety 
Requirement Analysis]
17, the relevant elements of the COTS equipment 
specification [REF to Equipment Specification] that correctly and completely 
implement the requirement have been identified [REF to Traceability Matrix].  
For example, specification items x to z may fulfil a particular COTS equipment 
behavioural Safety Requirement. In some cases, the traceability matrix may have 
to be supplemented by analyses to show that two or more product specification 
elements compose to satisfy an equipment Safety Requirement [REF to 
Evidence of  composability verification, if relevant]. 
This was identified by a review [REF to Review Records] conducted by 
competent [REF to Competence Evaluation] staff from both the ANSP and the 
supplier.  The criteria for competence need to be specified here. 
                                                  
 
17 See RV1. 
RV1.1 
The COTS equipment behaviour 
required by the COTS equipment 
behavioural safety requirements has 
been identified  
RV1.1 
As relevant elements of the COTS 
equipment specification that 
correctly and completely implement 
the behavioural safety requirements 
have been identified 
Equipment Safety 
Requirement 
Analysis
Traceability 
Matrix 
Evidence of 
composability 
verification, if 
relevant
 
Review 
Records 
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Specification 
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RV1.2   The software specification items that support the COTS equipment 
specification have been identified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This part of the requirements validity argument justifies requirement validity at 
software level, and so is intended for cases where assurance (e.g. requirement 
satisfaction assurance) is gained from software-level evidence (e.g. software 
design features). 
At the current Roadmap position, the CEET usually permits sufficient assurance 
to be gained from equipment-level evidence only (for Safety Requirements up to 
1 x 10
-5). This part of the argument is only required, for requirement validity at 
software level, when integrity points are claimed for “knowledge of internal design 
features”. 
To argue about the safety requirements at software level, the COTS equipment 
behavioural safety requirements have to be apportioned to the relevant software 
functionality.  However, to support the limited usage of software-level evidence at 
this roadmap stage, and to address issues associated with unrequired software  
functionality, complete tracing (not apportionment) is required, as follows. 
For each element of the COTS equipment specification [REF to Equipment 
Specification], the relevant elements of the COTS Software Specification [REF to  
Software Specification] have been identified [REF to software traceability matrix].  
For example, COTS Software Specification items Sx to Sz fulfil the COTS   
equipment specification items x to z. In some cases, the software traceability 
matrix may have to be supplemented by analyses to show that two or more 
software specification elements compose to satisfy a COTS equipment 
specification element [REF to Evidence of composability verification, if relevant]. 
RV1.2 
The software specification items that 
support the COTS equipment 
specification have been identified 
RV1.2 
As the relevant elements of the 
COTS Software Specification have 
been identified  
Competence 
Evaluation 
Equipment 
specification 
 
Software 
Specification 
Evidence of 
composability 
verification, if 
relevant
Review 
records 
Software 
Traceability 
Matrix
This part of the argument is 
only used when RS 1.2.4 relies 
on software level knowledge of 
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Therefore, the software specification items that support the COTS equipment 
specification have been identified. 
This was identified by a review [REF to Review Records] conducted by 
competent [REF to Competence Evaluation] staff from the supplier.  
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ANNEX  D CONFIGURATION CONSISTENCY ARGUMENT DIAGRAM TEMPLATE FOR 
1 X 10
-5 REQUIREMENTS 
CC1  All safety arguments and evidence are valid for the operational 
equipment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The evidence is uniquely identified so that it can be referenced (Claim CC1.1), 
and the build state of the operational equipment is known [REF to Operational 
Equipment Build Statement]. These claims allow the argument to be made that 
the safety arguments (Claim CC1.2) and the evidence referenced (Claim CC1.3) 
relate to the operational equipment. 
Therefore, the arguments and evidence, for the safety of the software in the 
system context, are from: a known executable version of the software and a 
known set of software products, data and descriptions that have been used in the 
production of that version (i.e. all safety arguments and evidence are valid for the 
operational equipment). 
 
 
CC1 
All safety arguments and evidence 
are valid for the operational 
equipment 
CC1 
As uniquely identified evidence 
enables the safety arguments to show 
that they reason about the operational 
equipment 
CC1.2 
The safety arguments relate to 
the operational equipment 
Operational 
Equipment 
Build Statement 
CC1.1 
The evidence is uniquely 
identified so that it can be 
referenced  
CC1.3 
The evidence referenced 
relates to the operational 
equipment 
CC1.2 
As the example arguments have 
been appropriately tailored and 
reviewed for correctness 
CC1.1 
As document/equipment control 
procedures ensure unique 
identification 
CC1.3 
As this has been ensured by the 
ANSP 
Review and 
Approval 
records 
Document/Equipment 
control procedures 
Evidence of 
configuration 
consistency 
Review and 
Approval 
procedures 
COTS 
equipment 
specific 
argument 
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CC1.1 The evidence is uniquely identified so that it can be referenced  
All evidence is uniquely identified because normal management procedures [REF 
to Document/Equipment control procedures] stipulate that unique reference 
identifiers are given to items such as equipment and documents used as 
evidence, etc. This allows different versions of the same item to be differentiated 
from each other.  
Therefore, evidence is uniquely identified so that it can be referenced.  
It may be possible to draw on audit reports to show evidence that the procedure 
is followed.  
It may be possible to give the list of evidence items referenced in the safety 
argument, to demonstrate that they have unique identifiers. 
CC1.2 The safety arguments relate to the operational equipment 
The safety arguments presented here are valid for the operational version of the 
equipment because they have been derived from the template arguments in the 
SRG ‘Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment’ 
with appropriate tailoring to suit the circumstances of the COTS equipment [REF 
to Operational Equipment Build Statement] and the available evidence
18.  
The review and approval [REF to Review and Approval procedures, and REF to 
Review and Approval records] of these arguments confirm their validity for the 
operational version. 
Therefore, the safety arguments relate to the operational equipment. 
CC1.3 The evidence referenced relates to the operational equipment 
The ANSP must provide an argument here, addressing the following issues. 
For a COTS purchase, evidence derived from the equipment by the ANSP will be 
valid for the operational version of the equipment. However, where the evidence 
refers to a different version, a rationale must be given to justify why the evidence 
remains valid for the argument for the operational version. Such arguments may 
be inserted at the point of use elsewhere in the safety arguments (it would add to 
the credibility of this argument if these points are listed/referenced here), or this  
may be addressed by making all such arguments in one place i.e. as part of this  
argument.  
Appropriate practices are (naturally) selected by the ANSP manager to ensure  
that this claim is true. This could be by knowledge that only a single valid version  
exists of each evidence item, or could require a more formal examination of the 
versions of evidence, and configuration management data, and documenting the  
results. Evidence of this may already exist as the result of a Quality Assurance  
activity. Any such results are ‘Evidence of Configuration Consistency’ and should  
be referenced. 
                                                  
 
18 This is effectively a formal statement by the ANSP that the arguments presented are suitable for the 
particular equipment, such that the ANSP takes ownership of the safety argument. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
Annex D Configuration Consistency Argument Diagram Template for 1 x 10
-5 Requirements 
 
March 2010     Page 43 
If evidence has been altered, it must be argued that the alterations are justified. 
Some evidence accepted by the ‘COTS Evidence Evaluation Tables’ (CEET) is  
not version specific (e.g. supplier experience), and some evidence inherently 
relates to previous versions (e.g. field service experience). The CEET discounts  
the assurance benefit to account for the differences. These cases are inherently  
justified by showing that the evidence meets the evidence criteria in the CEET. 
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ANNEX  E REQUIREMENTS SATISFACTION ARGUMENT DIAGRAM TEMPLATE FOR 
1 X 10
-5 REQUIREMENTS 
RS1  The COTS equipment behavioural Safety Requirements are satisfied 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequate evidence of behaviour can be gained at the COTS equipment level 
(Claim RS1.1), and there is adequate evidence that the Safety Requirements are 
met at the COTS equipment level (Claim RS1.2).  Optional text: , supplemented 
by some knowledge of internal design features. 
Therefore, there is adequate evidence that the COTS equipment behavioural 
Safety Requirements are satisfied. 
RS1 
The COTS equipment 
behavioural Safety 
Requirements are satisfied 
RS1 
As adequate evidence can be 
gained, and has been gained, that 
the behavioural Safety 
Requirements are met at the 
equipment level 
RS1.1 
Adequate evidence of 
behaviour can be gained 
at the COTS equipment 
level
RS1.2 
There is adequate 
evidence that the Safety 
Requirements are met at 
the equipment level Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.1  Adequate evidence of behaviour can be gained at the COTS   
equipment level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RS1.1.2 
The safety 
requirements are 
observable at 
the equipment 
boundary 
RS1.1.3 
All output states that 
need to be tested can be 
stimulated by specified 
action at the input 
domain 
RS1.1.4 
Sufficient state space 
can be exercised 
RS1.1.1 
As the safety objectives 
were set at a ‘broadly 
acceptable’ level of risk 
and the resulting safety 
requirements are not 
more onerous than 
1x10
-5 
RS1.1.2
As the safety 
requirements have 
been expressed in 
terms of observable 
equipment outputs 
RS1.1.4 
As the equipment is 
sufficiently simple 
Requirements 
Safety Case
COTS 
Evidence 
Evaluation 
Tables 
(CEET J.1) 
Soak Test Script 
and/ or Supplier 
Test Script 
Soak Test 
Results and/ or 
Supplier Test 
Results 
RS1.1 
As low confidence is sufficient 
and can be achieved by 
examining the behaviour of the 
software from the equipment 
boundary
Initial Monitoring 
Instructions 
RS1.1.1 
The integrity 
requirements of this 
equipment meet the 
integrity and risk 
criteria  
RS1.1 
Adequate evidence of 
behaviour can be gained 
at the COTS equipment 
level
RS 1.1.3 
As a competent 
person was able to 
produce test scripts 
Equipment 
Specification
Guidance for Producing 
SW01 Safety Arguments 
For COTS Equipment 
Test Scripts Competency 
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It is possible to stimulate the equipment’s inputs and observe the required safety  
behaviour at its outputs (Claim RS1.1.2 and Claim RS1.1.3).  When the software  
state space is sufficiently small (Claim RS1.1.4), the CAA ‘Guidance for   
Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment’ authorises the   
assumption that testing at equipment level can cover sufficient of this state space  
to demonstrate Requirement Satisfaction, with a low level of confidence, for   
integrity requirements no worse than 1 x 10
-5, without further supporting   
evidence.  
A low level of confidence of requirement satisfaction is acceptable when system  
Safety Requirements are set to achieve ‘broadly acceptable’ levels of risk.  The  
integrity requirements of this equipment meet the integrity and risk criteria (Claim  
RS1.1.1).  
Under these circumstances, adequate evidence of behaviour can be gained at  
the COTS equipment level.  
RS1.1.1 The integrity requirements of this equipment meet the integrity and 
risk criteria   
The Safety Requirements are not more onerous than 1  x  10
-5  [REF to 
Requirements Safety Case], and are valid because they are derived from Safety 
Objectives that were set at a broadly acceptable level of risk [REF to   
Requirements Safety Case], such that low confidence is required thus meeting 
the integrity and risk criteria set in this guidance (see the Rationale in Annex K of  
the CAA ‘Guidance for producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS   
Equipment’). 
RS1.1.2 The safety requirements are observable at the equipment boundary  
The required safety behaviour (COTS Equipment Safety Requirements) is 
observable at the equipment boundary because they are expressed in terms of  
effects at the output of the equipment. This can be seen by inspection of the  
COTS Equipment Safety Requirements in the Requirements Safety Case [REF to  
Requirements Safety Case]. 
RS1.1.3 All output states that need to be tested can be stimulated by 
specified action at the input domain  
All output states that need to be tested can be stimulated by specified action at 
the input domain. This was demonstrated by the successful creation of the test  
scripts by a person familiar with the application, using the equipment specification  
to create tests that, for each safety requirement, adequately cover the output   
range, without identifying any aspects of the requirements as being un-testable.  
The Test Scripts [REF to Test Scripts] show a comprehensive set of tests for 
each safety requirement [REF to Requirements Safety Case], and were prepared  
by [NAME of competent person], who is considered competent [REF to 
Competency Evaluation] to prepare test scripts and to have had adequate 
knowledge  of the equipment [REF to Equipment Specification] and application.  Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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-5 Requirements 
 
March 2010     Page 47 
RS1.1.4 Sufficient state space can be exercised  
Although the input and output domains of the equipment are known sufficiently to 
test the full range of outputs, the internal variable domain of the software is not 
known. Without knowledge of the complexity of the implementation, this safety  
argument cannot provide assurance that sufficient state space can be exercised. 
However, due to the mitigations provided by setting requirements at a broadly 
acceptable level of risk (such that low confidence of requirement satisfaction is  
required), and the extra initial vigilance on entry to service [REF to Initial 
Monitoring Instructions], SRG authorises the assumption that meeting the soak or  
supplier testing requirements in the CEET (Annex J of ‘Guidance for Producing  
SW01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment’) provides adequate coverage of 
the state space for simple equipment
19. 
The equipment is sufficiently simple and (either or both of the following) soak 
testing and/ or supplier test evidence meets the evidence criteria in the CEET 
[REF to Soak Test Script and Soak Test Results and/ or Supplier Test Scripts  
and Supplier Test Results]. 
The ‘Initial Monitoring Instructions’ should attempt to detect and record any   
behaviour that is not specified in the COTS Equipment Specification. 
 
 
                                                  
 
19 The claim that “Sufficient state space can be exercised” is far more credible for a ‘smaller’, single 
purpose equipment with bespoke platform like a radio than for a ‘larger’ sub-system based on a more 
general purpose computing platform.  It would not be a credible claim for a cluster of PCs or similar. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.2 There is adequate evidence that the Safety Requirements are met at  
the equipment level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the ‘Guidance for Producing SW01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment’,  
SRG has provided a scheme for determining the level of assurance provided by  
Requirement Satisfaction evidence. The COTS Evidence Evaluation Table 
defines criteria for the evidence, and assurance points that can be claimed for 
that evidence.  The Guidance requires that the total of the assurance points must  
exceed a defined minimum level.   
[ANSP] agrees that the assurance provided by evaluation of the COTS 
equipment, using this scheme, is sufficient
20. 
                                                  
 
20 This is effectively a formal statement by the ANSP that the argument is not invalidated by contrary 
evidence or other circumstances. 
RS1.2 
There is adequate evidence 
that the Safety Requirements 
are met at the equipment 
level 
RS1.2 
As the arguments and evidence 
for subclaims RS1.2.1 to RS1.2.4 
combine to provide enough points
from CEET J.1 to J.5. 
Multiple 
arguments will be 
required for 
multiple safety 
requirements 
COTS Evidence 
Evaluation Tables 
(CEET J.1 to J.5)
RS1.2.1 
Sufficient test evidence 
has been accumulated to 
support the argument that 
the Safety Requirements 
are met at the equipment 
level 
RS1.2.2 
Sufficient field service 
evidence has been 
accumulated to support the 
argument that the Safety 
Requirements are met at the 
equipment level 
RS1.2.3 
Sufficient evidence of supplier 
reputation has been accumulated 
to support the argument that the 
Safety Requirements are met at 
the equipment level 
RS1.2.4 
Sufficient design evidence has 
been accumulated to support the 
argument that the Safety 
Requirements are met at the 
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Sufficient functional and integrity evidence has been accumulated that shows that 
the safety requirements are met at the equipment level. This evidence comprises: 
Test, Field Service, Supplier reputation and Design evidence [delete as 
applicable]. 
For each type of evidence, the claim for the number of ‘functional points’ and 
‘integrity points’ is justified in the arguments that follow, in accordance with the 
CEET.  The points claimed are:  
•  100 functional points
21 from test evidence  
•  It integrity points It from test evidence (see RS1.2.1) 
•  If integrity points from field service evidence (see RS1.2.2) 
•  Is integrity points from supplier reputation evidence (see RS 1.2.3) 
•  Id integrity points from design evidence (see RS 1.2.4) 
The evidence is judged to be sufficient because the CEET was used to determine 
that the minimum of 100 functional and 100 (It + If + Is + Id) integrity points has  
been achieved. 
Notes regarding presentation of multiple arguments for multiple groups of  
Safety Requirements: 
It is important that the evidence is credible for each Safety Requirement. The  
arguments should show this as clearly as possible to ease review and audit. For  
example, if a single Safety Requirement were selected, then the relevant tests  
and test records for that requirement must be identifiable, and it is best to include  
such traceability in the safety argument. The CEET includes some Evidence   
Satisfaction Criteria that are intended to address this. 
It may not be possible (valid) to claim the same level of assurance for all Safety  
Requirements from a particular source of evidence. For example, even though  
the CEET requires a similar environment, the available field-service evidence   
may not have exercised certain features of a product relevant to some Safety  
Requirements. For those Safety Requirements, alternative evidence must be   
used and therefore other variants of the arguments used. 
Different arguments may be presented for groups of Safety Requirements,   
according to the available evidence from test, field service, supplier reputation  
and design. These arguments could have common elements, for example the  
claim and argument for FAT and SAT, but might refer to different evidence from  
field service experience, supplier testing and design evidence. 
                                                  
 
21 No other result is possible in a complete argument. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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The RS1.2 boilerplate text above presents an argument where all Safety   
Requirements are shown to be satisfied using the same types of evidence.   
ANSPs may group safety requirements together, according to the requirement 
satisfaction evidence available, and present separate requirement satisfaction   
arguments (for the CAE sub-diagram RS1.2 and below) for each group, or even 
for  single safety requirements.  Each requirement satisfaction argument sub-
diagram must show that 100 functional points and 100 integrity points have been  
accumulated for each safety requirement in the group. 
When there is more than one Safety Requirement group, it must be shown that  
each Safety Requirement has been allocated to one of the groups. 
In practice, at this stage of the Roadmap, the CEET points scheme means that  
there will be few cases where there are such variations in the points claimed from  
each evidence type. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.2.1 Test  Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of the available evidence with the CEET J.1 and J.5 shows that a 
total of It integrity points and 100 functional points can be claimed. This is made  
up as follows: 
All Safety Requirements are shown to have been addressed by tests either in 
FAT or in SAT [REF to Test Traceability Matrix], meeting the evidence criteria in  
the CEET J.5.  Therefore, 100 functional points are claimed. 
FAT has been conducted, and met the evidence criteria in the CEET J.1 [REF to  
FAT Test Script and FAT Test Results]. No violations of the Safety Requirements 
were observed during the tests [REF to FAT Test Results]. Therefore x integrity 
points
22 are claimed.  
                                                  
 
22 Here, x is used throughout to denote a number of points derived from the CEET, according to the 
evidence provided. 
FAT Test Script
(CEET J.1 & J.5)
FAT Test Results 
(CEET J.1 & J.5) 
SAT Test Script 
(CEET J.1 & J.5) 
SAT Test Results
(CEET J.1 & J.5)
Supplier System 
Level Test Results 
(CEET J.1) 
Supplier System 
Level Test Script 
(CEET J.1) 
Evidence of user 
training taking place 
(CEET J.1) 
Soak Test Results
(CEET J.1) 
Soak Test Scripts
(CEET J.1) 
COTS Evidence 
Evaluation Tables 
(CEET J.1 & J.5) 
Test Traceability Matrix 
(CEET J.1 & J.5) 
RS1.2.1 
Sufficient test evidence has been 
accumulated to support the 
argument that the Safety 
Requirements are met at the 
equipment level 
RS1.2.1 
As sufficient functional & integrity 
assurance points have been 
accumulated from Test evidence Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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SAT has been conducted, and met the evidence criteria in the CEET J.1 [REF to  
SAT Test Script and SAT Test Results]. No violations of the Safety Requirements 
were observed during the tests [REF to SAT Test Results]. Therefore x integrity  
points are claimed.  
ANSP Soak Testing (y weeks
23) has been conducted, and met the evidence   
criteria in the CEET J.1 [REF to Soak Test Scripts and Soak Test Results]. No 
violations of the Safety Requirements were observed during the tests [REF to  
Soak Test Results]. Therefore x integrity points are claimed. 
User Training (y weeks) has been conducted, and met the evidence criteria 
in CEET J.1 [REF to Evidence of user training taking place]. No violations of the 
Safety Requirements were observed during the training (no counter-evidence   
available). Therefore x integrity points are claimed. 
y system-months of Supplier testing (System Level) have been conducted, and 
met the evidence criteria in the CEET J.1 [REF to Supplier System Level Test  
Script and Supplier System Level Test Results]. No violations of the Safety 
Requirements were observed during the tests [REF to Supplier System Level   
Test Results]. Therefore x integrity points are claimed. 
[If applicable] The integrity points total exceeds the maximum claimable for 
(CEET J.1) for testing of 1 x 10
-5 requirements, and so this is capped at 75. 
In each case, this argument has assumed that the 'Evidence Satisfaction Criteria' 
in the  CEET have been met for each evidence item. In a real argument this 
should be briefly argued, otherwise each reviewer will need to access the   
evidence to determine whether the criteria are met. 
                                                  
 
23 Here, y is used throughout to denote a period of time specific to the COTS in question. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.2.2  Field Service Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of the available evidence with CEET J.2 shows that If integrity points  
can be claimed.  
The argument that the field service experience meets the evidence criteria in   
CEET J.2 is as follows. 
The  COTS equipment specific argument that needs to be inserted here to 
claim field service experience will depend on the data held. Having selected a  
matching Field Service experience scenario from CEET J.2 (e.g. ‘Same system  
on a similar platform’), the argument must show that the available field service 
experience matches that scenario, and justify that the evidence available meets  
the Evidence Satisfaction Criteria given in that row of CEET J.2. 
As an example, the argument that the field service for which evidence is held 
meets the evidence criteria in the CEET for field service experience 'Of the same  
system on the same platform' could be similar to the following: 
Field service experience is being claimed from an equipment that has been   
operating for 1.5 years at <location>. The equipment is identical to that being 
justified in this example [REFs to equipment build statement in Doc Y and build  
statement for operational equipment], and therefore qualifies as ‘the same   
system on the same platform’ in the CEET. It also meets the criterion for a similar 
environment. Analysing  the occurrences reported by users [REF to written   
statement of observed failures in Doc Y], it was found that none contravene the 
current Safety Requirements, indicating that the future rates are expected to be  
less than those stipulated for each Safety Requirement. 
RS1.2.2 
Sufficient field service evidence has been 
accumulated to support the argument that 
the safety requirements are met at the 
equipment level 
RS1.2.2 
As sufficient integrity 
assurance points have 
been accumulated from 
Field Service evidence 
Equipment-specific 
evidence that satisfies the 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria for the selected 
scenario in CEET J.2 
 
 
COTS Evidence Evaluation 
Table (CEET) J.2 
COTS 
equipment 
specific 
argument 
required Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.2.3  Supplier Reputation Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of the available evidence with CEET J.3 shows that Is integrity points  
can be claimed.  
The argument that the supplier experience and expertise evidence meets the 
evidence criteria in CEET J.3 is as follows. 
The  COTS equipment specific argument that needs to be inserted here to   
claim supplier reputation will depend on the data available. Having selected a  
matching supplier reputation scenario from CEET J.3 (e.g. 'Supplier has   
experience of deploying systems of the same type into the ATC market'), the  
argument must show that the available evidence matches that scenario, and   
justify that it meets the Evidence Satisfaction Criteria given in that row of CEET  
J.3. 
As an example, the argument that the supplier experience and expertise 
evidence meets the evidence criteria in CEET J.3 for ‘Supplier has experience of  
deploying systems of the same type into the ATC market’ could be similar to the  
following. 
RS1.2.3 
As sufficient integrity assurance 
points have been accumulated from 
Supplier Reputation evidence 
RS1.2.3  
Sufficient evidence of supplier 
reputation has been accumulated to 
support the argument that the Safety 
Requirements are met at the equipment 
level 
Equipment-specific 
evidence that satisfies the 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria for the selected 
scenario in CEET J.3 
 
 
COTS Evidence Evaluation 
Table (CEET) J.3 
COTS 
equipment 
specific 
argument 
required Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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The supplier has been producing similar types of system for greater than 15 
years, is experienced in the ATC domain and has delivered systems successfully  
to other ANSPs and can provide evidence to support the success at these other 
units. The service history records [REF to service history records] show service 
records for all equipment of this type. Analysing these records, it was found that  
no faults occurred that contravene the current Safety Requirements, indicating  
that the future rates are expected to be less than those stipulated for each Safety 
Requirement. Additionally, the supplier has provided a statement regarding its  
experience in the market [REF to supplier experience statement], which shows  
successful installations at 30 locations over the last 17 years, with no instances of 
significant faults being reported. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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RS1.2.4  Evidence of Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of the available design evidence with CEET J.4 shows that Id  
integrity points can be claimed. 
The argument that the Design evidence meets the evidence criteria in CEET J.4 
is as follows. 
The  COTS equipment specific argument that needs to be inserted here to 
claim design evidence will depend on the data available. Having selected a   
matching design evidence scenario from CEET J.4 (e.g. 'Knowledge of internal 
design features which have been put in place to limit the possibility of unwanted  
system action’'), the argument must show that the available evidence matches  
that scenario, and justify that it meets the Evidence Satisfaction Criteria given in  
that row of CEET J.4. 
The intent of this argument is to permit appropriate assurance points to be   
claimed for using professionally engineered equipment, which has been   
developed with product assurance in mind and incorporates suitable design   
features. 
If the manufacturer provides sufficient evidence of having followed recognised 
assurance processes during the development of the COTS equipment, then it is  
permissible to claim assurance points for these at this stage of the Roadmap. In 
future stages of the Roadmap the efficacy of these processes will have to be  
demonstrated. 
RS1.2.4 
Sufficient design evidence has been 
accumulated to support the argument that the 
Safety Requirements are met at the 
equipment level 
RS1.2.4 
As sufficient integrity assurance points have 
been accumulated from Design evidence 
Equipment-specific 
evidence that satisfies the 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria for the selected 
scenario in CEET J.4 
 
 
COTS Evidence Evaluation 
Table (CEET) J.4 
COTS 
equipment 
specific 
argument 
required Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Professionally engineered equipment usually utilises features that are absent   
from budget consumer-level equipment, and are designed to address failures, 
whether caused internally or externally.  Examples of these features include   
checksums, range checking, and anti-jabber circuits.  
If the manufacturer provides sufficient details of mitigatory features, in a   
controlled specification document applicable to the specific version of COTS 
equipment used, then the relevance of these features to the safety requirements  
can be considered.  If a specified feature provides relevant mitigation for failure to  
meet a safety requirement, then it is permissible to claim assurance points for it. 
Naturally, assurance points for a mitigatory feature only apply to the safety 
requirement(s) mitigated.  When requirement satisfaction is argued for a group of  
safety requirements (see notes under RS1.2), assurance points from mitigations 
can only be claimed if there is a relevant mitigation for each safety requirement in  
the group.  Safety requirements not so mitigated would need to be addressed in  
another group, and arguments presented accordingly. 
At this stage of the Roadmap mitigatory features are permitted to be implemented 
in the same software as the function being mitigated (i.e. they are not strictly   
independent).  This admits the mitigation provided when the output of a function  
is range checked.  However, a limiting proviso on this is that there is no obvious 
common cause for their failure, for example a failure that causes loss of one  
software function is likely to cause loss (failure) of the mitigatory feature. 
It is accepted that some mitigatory features  may be impossible to test due to 
inability to stimulate the error that causes it to operate, but where practical the  
efficacy of the feature should be tested. 
Arguments about design features can be made at the equipment level if they are 
revealed in the product specification. Alternatively, if they are revealed in the 
software specification the argument can be made at that level, provided that 
argument RV1.2 is also addressed in the submitted safety argument. 
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ANNEX  F REQUIREMENTS TRACEABILITY ARGUMENT DIAGRAM TEMPLATE FOR 
1 X 10
-5 REQUIREMENTS 
RT1  All Safety Requirements can be traced to the same level of design at  
which their satisfaction is demonstrated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References to Requirements Validity in this argument are deliberate as at this 
stage of the Roadmap sufficient assurance of Requirements Traceability may be  
gained by completing the Requirements Validity argument. 
Traceability of the system Safety Requirements  to the COTS equipment  
specification was demonstrated as part of demonstrating that system Safety 
Requirements  have been correctly apportioned to the COTS equipment 
specification in Requirements Validity (Claim RV1.1).  
Either:  Therefore, as Requirement Satisfaction is demonstrated at the COTS  
equipment level, the system Safety Requirements are traceable to the 
level at which Requirement Satisfaction is demonstrated.  
Or:  Text for when ‘knowledge of internal design features’ is used in the 
Requirement Satisfaction argument:  Traceability of the COTS   
equipment specification to the COTS Software Specification (Claim 
RV1.2) was established as part of the successful demonstration of 
Requirements Validity. 
Any other 
Requirements 
Traceability evidence 
voluntarily declared 
RT1 
All Safety Requirements can 
be traced to the same level of 
design at which their 
satisfaction is demonstrated
RT1 
As the Safety Requirements have been 
traced to the COTS Equipment Product 
Specification, and if necessary to the 
software specification 
RV1.1 
The COTS equipment 
behaviour required by the 
COTS equipment behavioural 
safety requirements has been 
identified  
RV1.2 
The software specification 
items that support the COTS 
equipment specification have 
been identified 
The ANSP should 
enhance this 
argument where 
additional 
arguments/ evidence 
are available Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Therefore, as Requirement Satisfaction is demonstrated at the COTS  
equipment level, supplemented by ‘knowledge of internal design 
features,’ the system Safety Requirements are traceable to the level at 
which Requirement Satisfaction is demonstrated.  
In theory Requirements Traceability needs to support the Non-Interference   
argument in addition to the Requirement Satisfaction argument. Currently, this 
Guidance permits sufficient assurance of non-interference to be claimed from the  
same evidence used in the Requirement Satisfaction argument, and therefore no  
additional Requirements Traceability is required to support the Non-Interference 
argument. (The Non-Interference argument would normally be required to   
support the Requirement Satisfaction argument, because the COTS equipment  
specification is unlikely to completely specify the behaviour of the COTS   
equipment). 
ANSPs should reference any directly relevant Requirements Traceability 
evidence items, and consider what the evidence shows about requirements   
traceability. It is not currently mandatory to seek  additional evidence for   
Requirements Traceability. 
The Requirements Validity argument uses traceability matrices and the 
Requirement Satisfaction argument requires a traceability matrix from   
requirements to tests and results (see the CEET J.1 and J.5). 
Some forms of evidence (e.g. supplier reputation) can apply to set of   
requirements 'en masse' and so cannot be traced to a specific requirement. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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ANNEX  G  NON-INTERFERENCE ARGUMENT DIAGRAM TEMPLATE FOR 1  X  10
-5 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
NI1  Safety functions are not interfered with by other functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References to Requirements Satisfaction in this argument are deliberate as at  
this stage of the Roadmap sufficient assurance of Non-Interference may be   
gained by completing the Requirements Satisfaction argument. 
NI1 
Safety functions are 
not interfered with by 
other functions 
NI1 
As there is adequate assurance 
from knowledge of the equipment 
and the supplier 
NI1.2 
The supplier used 
practices to avoid 
introduction of 
interference 
mechanisms 
NI1.1 
The COTS equipment 
specification is an 
adequate description of 
the actual behaviour of 
the COTS equipment 
NI1.3 
Any interference is 
unlikely to affect main 
specification items  
NI1.1 
As there is adequate 
assurance from testing, 
supplied information and 
supplier reputation 
Evidence such as: equipment 
level testing; supplier reputation; 
design information; absence of 
counter-evidence; lists of ‘bugs’ & 
‘known issues’; operating 
procedures/guidance; interface 
testing at various levels etc 
NI1.2 
As there is adequate 
assurance from supplier 
practices and design 
information 
NI1.3 
As there is adequate 
assurance from design 
information and supplier 
reputation 
Evidence of good practices, 
including: fault avoidance, 
detection and tolerance 
techniques; memory management 
units; low coupling; separate s/w 
tasks; tying off unused parts of the 
OS; use of tools and reviews etc 
Evidence based on: 
supplier reputation, 
processes and 
experience in the 
ATC market, design 
information etc 
Equipment 
Specification 
COTS 
equipment 
specific 
argument 
required 
COTS 
equipment 
specific 
argument 
required 
COTS 
equipment 
specific 
argument 
required Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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The non-interference argument is mainly COTS equipment specific.  This 
example provides several conjectured arguments for non-interference to indicate  
the relevant types of argument and evidence. 
Currently, sufficient assurance of non-interference may be claimed from the same 
evidence used in the Requirement Satisfaction argument, although ANSPs may 
choose to provide additional evidence. ANSPs must submit COTS equipment   
specific arguments, perhaps based on the conjectured arguments, and reference 
the available relevant evidence items.  
The COTS equipment specification is an adequate description of the actual   
behaviour of the COTS equipment (Claim NI1.1). Requirement Satisfaction   
confirms that this is true for the specification elements that relate to COTS   
equipment behavioural Safety Requirements.  Therefore, other behaviour within 
the equipment does not interfere with the safety functions.   
Additionally, the supplier used practices to avoid introduction of interference   
mechanisms (Claim NI1.2), and even if these failed to prevent interference, any 
such interference (unknown behaviour) is unlikely to affect main specification   
items of the COTS equipment in its declared specification (Claim NI1.3). 
Therefore, safety functions are not interfered with by other functions. 
NI1.1 The COTS equipment specification is an adequate description of the  
actual behaviour of the COTS equipment  
The completeness of the supplier's specification cannot be fully known, but   
assurance can be gained to an extent commensurate with safety risk.  
If the COTS equipment specification [REF Equipment Specification] specified all 
the behaviour of the COTS equipment, then there would be no additional   
behaviour to interfere with that behaviour.  In these circumstances, if all elements 
of the COTS equipment specification relating to the COTS equipment behavioural  
Safety Requirements had been identified (i.e. Requirements Validity) and then  
verified (i.e. Requirements Satisfaction), then any other behaviour could not 
interfere with the safety functions, and the non-interference objective would be  
met. 
The COTS equipment specification is considered adequately complete because: 
A  COTS equipment specific argument should be made showing how this 
assurance is gained from available evidence, for example: 
•  Equipment-level testing (which is commensurate with perceived risk) is 
conducted over the range of expected operational scenarios, which should 
inherently reveal relevant undefined behaviour  
•  Supplier reputation  
•  Provided design information  
•  Absence of counter-evidence, e.g. tests may identify undocumented 
behaviour  
•  The level of detail regarding behaviour provided in the specification  
•  The provision of lists of ‘bugs’, ‘known issues’, etc  
•  The provision of operating procedures, or guidance. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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This could be augmented by drawing on interface testing at various levels of 
design, if the supplier were to provide such evidence. 
NI1.2 The supplier used practices to avoid introduction of interference   
mechanisms 
Suppliers adopt common good practices that are intended to result in a product 
that works to its requirements, and therefore they naturally avoid creating   
mechanisms that can lead to interference.  
A  COTS equipment specific argument should be made showing how this 
assurance is gained from available evidence, for example, relevant practices can  
include: 
•  Fault avoidance techniques in general  
•  Fault detection and fault tolerant techniques may be used  
•  Use of memory management units  
•  Use of low coupling in the software design  
•  Creation of separate software tasks  
•  ‘Tying off‘ unnecessary functionality and services in Operating Systems  
•  Use of tools and reviews are used to encourage/enforce these practices. 
The exact arguments that can be made here depend on what evidence the 
supplier can provide. 
NI1.3 Any interference is unlikely to affect main specification items of the 
COTS equipment in its declared specification 
This is primarily drawn from belief in the quality of the processes used by the  
supplier, and the experience of the supplier in the Air Traffic Control and similar  
markets.  
It is not in the interests of any reputable supplier to market goods that do not 
meet their specification, and so the supplier’s activities/procedures are designed  
to prevent the incorporation of behaviour that adversely affects specified   
behaviour of the equipment. 
Given the absence of malevolent intent, the effect of any unintended interference  
should be insignificant. 
A  COTS equipment specific argument should be made showing how this   
assurance is gained from available evidence, for example: 
•  Supplier reputation 
•  Previous ANSP experience of the supplier 
•  Provided design information 
•  Supplier process evidence  
•  The level of detail regarding behaviour provided in the specification.  Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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ANNEX I  CEET REQUIREMENTS NO MORE ONEROUS THAN 1 X 10
-4 
The COTS Evidence Evaluation Table (CEET) for Requirements no more 
onerous than 1 x 10
-4 is split into a number of tables that address the functional 
and integrity assurance aspects of the Safety Requirements. The tables 
presented are: 
a) Integrity  assurance: 
•  Testing: Table I.1 
•  Field service: Table I.2 
•  Supplier experience and reputation: Table I.3 
•  Supplier Software design and development: Table I.4 
b)  Functional assurance: Table I.5 
At this stage of the Roadmap, the two CEETs (Annexes I and J) invoke the same 
evidence, although the assurance points awarded are different.  At future 
Roadmap stages, the two CEETs may diverge. Currently, the only deliberate 
difference in the specified evidence is in the last row of table I.4/J.4 and is due to 
the differences in the arguments.Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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-4 
 
March 2010     Page 65 
 
Table I.1: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-4 
Testing  A maximum of 90 points can be claimed for testing. Partial claims are not 
acceptable. Either the satisfaction criteria are met and the full points 
claimed or no points are claimed.  
IT IS MANDATORY TO HAVE EITHER FAT OR SAT 
IT IS MANDATORY TO HAVE EITHER ANSP SOAK TESTING OR SUPPLIER TESTING 
Specific Testing (Site Acceptance)  
F
u
l
l
 
t
e
s
t
 
 
 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
This testing is essentially designed to prove 
that the delivered system, after installation and 
commissioning, provides all of the required 
functionality. There is limited assurance as to 
whether the system will continue to operate in 
the same way with time in this testing.  
 
20 
   
Specific Testing (Factory 
Acceptance)  
F
u
l
l
 
t
e
s
t
 
 
 
 
This testing is essentially designed to prove 
that the system, prior to leaving the factory, 
provides all of the required functionality. There 
is limited assurance as to whether the system 
will continue to operate in the same way with 
time in this testing.  
 
 
20 
   
 
1. Test  Script. 
2. Test  Results. 
3. Test  Traceability 
matrix. 
Each functional Safety 
Requirement must be 
tested either during site or 
factory testing. 
Testing must include the 
extremes of conditions 
under which the system is 
expected to operate. 
Objective evidence of 
testing (and passing) of all 
functional Safety 
Requirements by providing 
traceability of Safety 
Requirement to test script 
to successful result. 
ANSP Soak Testing (including post 
Soak Testing observation) 
1
 
w
e
e
k
 
2
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
1
 
m
o
n
t
h
  Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
Running the system for a period of time 
(without reset) while it is exposed to a range of 
inputs which simulate the normal expected 
range of inputs - followed by a functional test 
(also without resetting the system) will give 
confidence that the system can continue to 
perform its function with time. The duration of 
time for which the system has been tested in 
this way together with any procedures that limit 
its expected operational time between resets 
will affect the level of confidence gained. 
 
50 
 
60 
 
70 
1. Test  Script. 
2. Test  Results. 
 
Objective evidence of 
testing (and passing). Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table I.1: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-4 
Testing  A maximum of 90 points can be claimed for testing. Partial claims are not 
acceptable. Either the satisfaction criteria are met and the full points 
claimed or no points are claimed.  
IT IS MANDATORY TO HAVE EITHER FAT OR SAT 
IT IS MANDATORY TO HAVE EITHER ANSP SOAK TESTING OR SUPPLIER TESTING 
Use of system for training 
1
 
w
e
e
k
 
2
 
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
1
 
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
The use of a system for user training will 
expose it to an independent set of user inputs 
that has the potential to expose previously un-
noticed bugs in the system. This use of the 
system, assuming it is fault free, will also add to 
the overall confidence of operating the system. 
 
 
20 
 
30 
 
40 
Evidence that system has 
been used for training over 
the claimed period with no 
reported faults. (Note that 
where a fault is exposed 
and adequately mitigated 
the points can still be 
claimed). 
This evidence could be, for 
example, Training Plan and 
Records or Training Error 
Log 
Supplier testing (System Level) 
 
1
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
-
m
o
n
t
h
 
2
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
-
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
6
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
-
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
As with ANSP Soak Testing, running the 
system for a period of time (without reset) while 
it is exposed to a range of inputs which 
simulate the normal expected range of inputs 
followed by a functional test (also without 
resetting the system) will give confidence that 
the system can continue to perform its function 
with time. The duration of time for which the 
system has been tested in this way together 
with any procedures that limit its expected 
operational time between resets will affect the 
level of confidence gained. 
 
50 
 
55 
 
60 
1. Test  Script. 
2. Test  Results. 
 
Objective evidence of 
testing (and passing). 
 
Table I.1: Integrity assurance from Testing Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table I.2: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-4 
Field service experience   Only one item from Field service experience can be 
claimed 
Of the same system on the same 
platform 
1
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
-
y
e
a
r
 
5
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
-
y
e
a
r
s
 
1
0
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
-
y
e
a
r
s
  Evidence Satisfaction  
Criteria 
ATC systems operate in a very similar 
environment in terms of their inputs and outputs 
wherever they are deployed. Evidence of in 
service experience of the same system, 
together with information on the faults 
experienced in that time has the potential to 
provide the greatest confidence in the integrity 
of the system. 
 
10 
 
40 
 
80 
o  Equipment Build 
statement. 
o  Statement of observed 
failures. 
(Any failures that do not 
meet the Safety 
Requirement would result in 
not claiming points). 
o  Location meets criterion 
for similar environment.  
Consideration of the 
operational environment 
where in service data is 
being claimed is adequately 
representative of the final 
operational environment. 
Of an earlier version of the same 
system on the same platform 
1
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
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y
e
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1
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s
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y
e
a
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  Evidence Satisfaction 
 Criteria 
An earlier version of the same system that 
reuses a very large percentage (95%) of the 
same code and is likely to exercise all of the 
hardware in the same way. Evidence of in 
service experience of such a system, together 
with information on the faults experienced in 
that time has the potential to provide a high 
degree of confidence in the integrity of the 
system. 
 
10 
 
30 
 
65 
o  Equipment Build 
statement. 
Evidence from the supplier 
that 95% of the code is 
unchanged. 
o  Statement of observed 
failures. 
(Any failures that do not 
meet the Safety 
Requirement would result in 
not claiming points). 
o  Location meets criterion 
for similar environment.  
Consideration of the 
operational environment 
where in service data is 
being claimed is adequately 
representative of the final 
operational environment. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table I.2: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-4 
Field service experience   Only one item from Field service experience can be 
claimed 
Of the same system on a similar 
platform (Operating System and or 
hardware) 
1
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Evidence Satisfaction  
Criteria 
Systems that have been ported onto a new 
platform, which have minor hardware changes 
and uses the same application code. 
Considerable confidence can be achieved from 
evidence of the fault free performance of such 
systems. 
 
(This is to cater for situations such as same PC 
can no longer be purchased and the change is 
not significant for this application e.g. only 
change is CPU speed). 
 
To claim these points a reasoned argument with 
evidence would need to be presented, which 
included analysis of the platform changes 
(demonstrating that the changes have no impact 
on the application). An example of such 
evidence would be Microsoft Certification. 
 
4 
 
16 
 
32 
o  Equipment Build 
statement. 
Evidence from the supplier 
that 100% of the application 
code is unchanged (NB 
application code excludes 
Operating System and 
Drivers). 
o  Statement of observed 
failures. 
(Any failures that do not 
meet the Safety 
Requirement would result in 
not claiming points). 
o  Location meets criterion 
for similar environment.  
Consideration of the 
operational environment 
where in service data is 
being claimed is adequately 
representative of the final 
operational environment. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table I.2: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-4 
Field service experience   Only one item from Field service experience can be 
claimed 
Of the same system on a previous 
platform (Operating System and or 
hardware) 
1
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Evidence Satisfaction  
Criteria 
Systems that have been ported onto a new 
platform (usually either for performance or 
obsolescence reasons) will re-use much if not 
all of the same application code. Considerable 
confidence can be achieved from evidence of 
the fault free performance of such systems. 
 
2 
 
8 
 
16 
o  Equipment Build 
statement. 
Evidence from the supplier 
that 95% of the application 
code is unchanged. 
o  Statement of observed 
failures. 
(Any failures that do not 
meet the Safety 
Requirement would result in 
not claiming points). 
o  Location meets criterion 
for similar environment.  
Consideration of the 
operational environment 
where in service data is 
being claimed is adequately 
representative of the final 
operational environment. 
Of a similar system by the same 
supplier 
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Evidence Satisfaction  
Criteria 
Evidence that demonstrates that the supplier 
has deployed a similar system (similar use and 
some code re-use) may provide some 
confidence. 
 
0 
 
0 
 
5 
Evidence of an adequately low 
failure rate of re-used code. 
Minimum of 5% of re-used code. 
Table I.2: Integrity assurance from field service data Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table I.3: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-4 
Supplier experience and 
expertise 
A maximum of 20 can be claimed from supplier 
experience and expertise 
Supplier has experience of 
deploying systems of the same type 
into the ATC market 
5
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Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
The ATC environment is very complex and 
suppliers having fielded systems of the same 
type into the market gives confidence in their 
understanding of the requirements and the 
issues surrounding the use of their systems. 
 
5 
 
10 
 
15 
Evidence of the supplier 
having a successful track 
record for the specified 
number of years in a 
relevant market sector. 
Supplier personnel involved with 
the COTS equipment have 
demonstrated expert knowledge in 
the field in which they are working 
L
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w
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  Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
The ATC environment is very complex and 
engineers having experience of fielded systems 
of the same type into the market gives 
confidence in their understanding of the 
requirements and the issues surrounding the 
use of their systems. 
 
10 
 
15 
 
20 
Evaluation of CVs of key 
personnel involved in the 
development and support of 
the COTS equipment. 
Table I.3: Integrity assurance from supplier experience and expertise 
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Table I.4: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-4 
Supplier Software design / 
development 
A maximum of 30 can be claimed from 
supplier software design / development 
Supplier can demonstrate successfully 
following an appropriate development 
process in the development of the 
system 
T
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  Evidence Satisfaction Criteria 
Processes such as IEC 61508 or ED 109 or other 
standards/processes that give confidence of the 
integrity of the software i.e. It has been designed in 
a consistent and documented manner and infers 
some level of review. This gives confidence that 
the coding will be robust. 
  These processes apply recommended levels of 
rigour that vary with the integrity requirement on 
the software being produced. 
 
10 
 
25 
 
30 
1.  Certificate of Conformance for 
the Product in question;
OR 
2.  Independent Audit of 
conformance; 
OR 
3.  Independent Audit of Justified 
Supplier Procedures. 
Note:  Independent is independent of 
the product development / support 
team. 
Knowledge of internal design features 
which have been put in place to limit 
the possibility of unwanted system 
action 
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Evidence Satisfaction Criteria 
Features in a system such as limiting the range on 
inputs to those expected or remove unwanted 
elements of an Operating System to ensure non-
interference, greatly increase confidence that the 
system will not act abnormally. 
 
5 
 
10 
  Design Documentation 
supporting claimed features AND 
evidence of their efficacy.  
 
Note: If design features at 
software level are argued, then 
arguments would need to be 
presented showing Traceability 
from the requirements to the 
features. 
Table I.4: Integrity assurance from supplier design and development methods 
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Table I.5 Functional assurance from 100% test coverage of functional Safety 
Requirements 
 
Table I.5: FUNCTIONAL Assurance Points  1 x 10
-4  
Testing  Functional assurance requirements can be fully 
satisfied through testing alone 
IT IS MANDATORY TO ACHIEVE COVERAGE OF ALL 
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS THROUGH 
FAT OR SAT 
Specific Testing (Site Acceptance)  
F
u
l
l
 
t
e
s
t
 
 
 
Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
This testing is essentially designed to prove that 
the delivered system, after installation and 
commissioning, provides all of the required 
functionality.  
   
Specific Testing (Factory 
Acceptance)  
 
 
This testing is essentially designed to prove that 
the system, prior to leaving the factory, provides 
all of the required functionality. Often this can 
include tests that cannot be repeated on site, 
particularly where a test harness is required 
and measurements related to timing and 
processor loading are being made.  
 
 
 
100 
 
   
 
1. Test  Script. 
2. Test  Results. 
3. Test  Traceability 
matrix. 
 
Each functional Safety 
Requirement must be 
tested either during site or 
factory testing. 
Testing must include the 
extremes of conditions 
under which the system is 
expected to operate. 
Objective evidence of 
testing (and passing) of all 
functional Safety 
Requirements by providing 
traceability of Safety 
Requirement to test script 
to successful result. 
 
Note: These are the same 
criteria as those required to 
claim Integrity points from 
SAT and FAT. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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ANNEX J  CEET REQUIREMENTS NO MORE ONEROUS THAN 1 X 10
-5 
 
The COTS Evidence Evaluation Table (CEET) for requirements no more onerous 
than  1 x 10
-5 is split into a number of tables that address the functional and 
integrity assurance aspects of the Safety Requirements. The tables presented 
are: 
•  Integrity assurance: 
o  Testing: Table J.1 
o  Field service: Table J.2 
o  Supplier experience and reputation: Table J.3 
o  Supplier Software design and development: Table J.4 
•  Functional assurance: Table J.5 
At this stage of the Roadmap, the two CEETs (Annexes I & J) invoke the same 
evidence, although the assurance points awarded are different.  At future 
Roadmap stages, the two CEETs may diverge. Currently, the only deliberate 
difference in the specified evidence is in the last row of table I.4/J.4 and is due to 
the differences in the arguments. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table J.1: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-5
Testing  A maximum of 75 points can be claimed for testing. Partial claims are not 
acceptable. Either the satisfaction criteria are met and the full points claimed 
or no points are claimed 
IT IS MANDATORY TO HAVE EITHER FAT OR SAT 
IT IS MANDATORY TO HAVE EITHER ANSP SOAK TESTING OR SUPPLIER TESTING 
Specific Testing (Site Acceptance)  
F
u
l
l
 
t
e
s
t
 
 
  Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
This testing is essentially designed to prove that 
the delivered system, after installation and 
commissioning, provides all of the required 
functionality. There is limited assurance as to 
whether the system will continue to operate in 
the same way with time in this testing. 
 
10 
   
Specific Testing (Factory 
Acceptance)  
F
u
l
l
 
t
e
s
t
 
 
 
This testing is essentially designed to prove that 
the system, prior to leaving the factory, provides 
all of the required functionality. There is limited 
assurance as to whether the system will 
continue to operate in the same way with time 
in this testing. 
 
 
10 
   
 
1. Test  Script. 
2. Test  Results. 
3. Traceability  matrix. 
 
Each functional Safety 
Requirement must be 
tested either during site or 
factory testing. 
Testing must include the 
extremes of conditions 
under which the system is 
expected to operate. 
Objective evidence of 
testing (and passing) of all 
functional Safety 
Requirements by providing 
traceability of Safety 
Requirement to test script 
to successful result. 
ANSP Soak Testing (including post 
Soak Testing observation) 
1
 
w
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2
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
1
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Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
Running the system for a period of time (without 
reset) while it is exposed to a range of inputs 
which simulate the normal expected range of 
inputs - followed by a functional test (also 
without resetting the system) will give 
confidence that the system can continue to 
perform its function with time. The duration of 
time for which the system has been tested in 
this way together with any procedures that limit 
its expected operational time between resets 
will affect the level of confidence gained. 
 
30 
 
35 
 
40 
1. Test  Script. 
2. Test  Results. 
 
Objective evidence of 
testing (and passing). 
Use of system for training 
 
1
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Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
The use of a system for user training will 
expose it to an independent set of user inputs 
that has the potential to expose previously un-
noticed bugs in the system. This use of the 
system, assuming it is fault free, will also add to 
 
10 
 
15 
 
20 
Evidence that system has 
been used for training over 
the claimed period with no 
reported faults. (Note that 
where a fault is exposed 
and adequately mitigated Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table J.1: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-5
Testing  A maximum of 75 points can be claimed for testing. Partial claims are not 
acceptable. Either the satisfaction criteria are met and the full points claimed 
or no points are claimed 
IT IS MANDATORY TO HAVE EITHER FAT OR SAT 
IT IS MANDATORY TO HAVE EITHER ANSP SOAK TESTING OR SUPPLIER TESTING 
the overall confidence of operating the  system.  the points can still be 
claimed). 
 
This evidence could be, for 
example, Training Plan and 
Records or Training Error 
Log. 
Supplier testing (System Level) 
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Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
As with ANSP Soak Testing, running the 
system for a period of time (without reset) while 
it is exposed to a range of inputs which simulate 
the normal expected range of inputs followed by 
a functional test (also without resetting the 
system) will give confidence that the system 
can continue to perform its function with time. 
The duration of time for which the system has 
been tested in this way together with any 
procedures that limit its expected operational 
time between resets will affect the level of 
confidence gained. 
 
30 
 
35 
 
40 
1. Test  Script. 
2. Test  Results. 
 
Objective evidence of 
testing (and passing). 
Table J.1: Integrity assurance from Testing Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
Annex J CEET Requirements no more Onerous than 1 x 10
-5 
 
March 2010     Page 76 
 
Table J.2: INTEGRITY Assurance 
Points  1 x 10
-5
Field service 
experience 
Only one item from Field service experience can be 
claimed 
Of the same system on the same 
platform 
1
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Evidence Satisfaction Criteria 
ATC systems operate in a very similar 
environment in terms of their inputs and 
outputs wherever they are deployed. 
Evidence of in service experience of the 
same system, together with information on 
the faults experienced in that time has the 
potential to provide the greatest confidence 
in the integrity of the system. 
 
10 
 
40 
 
80 
o  Equipment Build statement. 
o  Statement of observed 
failures. 
(Any failures that do not meet 
the Safety Requirement would 
result in not claiming points). 
o  Location meets criterion for 
similar environment. 
Consideration of the operational 
environment where in service 
data is being claimed is 
adequately representative of the 
final operational environment. 
Of an earlier version of the same 
system on the same platform 
1
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
-
y
e
a
r
 
5
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
-
y
e
a
r
s
 
1
0
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
-
y
e
a
r
s
  Evidence Satisfaction Criteria 
An earlier version of the same system that 
reuses a very large percentage (95%) of the 
same code and is likely to exercise all of the 
hardware in the same way. Evidence of in 
service experience of such a system, 
together with information on the faults 
experienced in that time has the potential to 
provide a high degree of confidence in the 
integrity of the system. 
 
10 
 
30 
 
65 
o  Equipment Build statement. 
Evidence from the supplier that 
95% of the code is unchanged. 
o  Statement of observed 
failures. 
(Any failures that do not meet 
the Safety Requirement would 
result in not claiming points). 
o  Location meets criterion for 
similar environment.  
Consideration of the operational 
environment where in service 
data is being claimed is 
adequately representative of the 
final operational environment. 
Of the same system on a similar 
platform (Operating System and 
or hardware) 
1
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  Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
Systems that have been ported onto a new 
platform, which have minor hardware 
changes and uses the same application 
code. Considerable confidence can be 
achieved from evidence of the fault free 
performance of such systems. 
 
 
4 
 
16 
 
32 
o  Equipment Build statement. 
Evidence from the supplier that 
100% of the application code is 
unchanged (NB application 
code excludes Operating 
System and Drivers). 
o  Statement of observed Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table J.2: INTEGRITY Assurance 
Points  1 x 10
-5
Field service 
experience 
Only one item from Field service experience can be 
claimed 
(This is to cater for situations such as same 
PC can no longer be purchased and the 
change is not significant for this application 
e.g. only change is CPU speed). 
 
To claim these points a reasoned argument 
with evidence would need to be presented, 
which included analysis of the platform 
changes (demonstrating that the changes 
have no impact on the application). An 
example of such evidence would be 
Microsoft Certification. 
failures. 
(any failures which do not meet 
the Safety Requirement would 
result in not claiming points) 
o  Location meets criterion for 
similar environment.  
Consideration of the operational 
environment where in service 
data is being claimed is 
adequately representative of the 
final operational environment. 
Of the same system on a previous 
platform (Operating System and 
or hardware) 
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  Evidence Satisfaction Criteria 
Systems that have been ported onto a new 
platform (usually either for performance or 
obsolescence reasons) will re-use much if 
not all of the same application code. 
Considerable confidence can be achieved 
from evidence of the fault free performance 
of such systems. 
 
2 
 
8 
 
16 
o  Equipment Build statement. 
Evidence from the supplier that 
95% of the application code is 
unchanged. 
o  Statement of observed 
failures. 
(Any failures that do not meet 
the Safety Requirement would 
result in not claiming points). 
o  Location meets criterion for 
similar environment.  
Consideration of the operational 
environment where in service 
data is being claimed is 
adequately representative of the 
final operational environment. 
Of a similar system by the same 
supplier 
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Evidence Satisfaction Criteria 
Evidence that demonstrates that the supplier 
has deployed a similar system (similar use 
and some code re-use) may provide some 
confidence. 
 
0 
 
0 
 
5 
Evidence of an adequately low 
failure rate of re-used code. 
Minimum of 5% of re-used code. 
Table J.2: Integrity assurance from field service data Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table J.3: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-5
Supplier experience and 
expertise 
A maximum of 20 can be claimed from supplier 
experience and expertise 
Supplier has experience of 
deploying systems of the same type 
into the ATC market 
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Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
The ATC environment is very complex and 
suppliers having fielded systems of the same 
type into the market gives confidence in their 
understanding of the requirements and the 
issues surrounding the use of their systems. 
 
5 
 
10 
 
15 
Evidence of the supplier 
having a successful track 
record for the specified 
number of years in a 
relevant market sector. 
Supplier personnel involved with 
the COTS equipment have 
demonstrated expert knowledge in 
the field in which they are working 
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Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
The ATC environment is very complex and 
engineers having experience of fielded systems 
of the same type into the market gives 
confidence in their understanding of the 
requirements and the issues surrounding the 
use of their systems. 
 
10 
 
15 
 
20 
Evaluation of CVs of key 
personnel involved in the 
development and support of 
the COTS equipment. 
Table J.3: Integrity assurance from supplier experience and expertise 
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Table J.4: INTEGRITY Assurance Points  1 x 10
-5
Supplier software design 
/ development 
A maximum of 30 can be claimed from supplier 
software design / development 
Supplier can demonstrate 
successfully following an 
appropriate development process in 
the development of the system 
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Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
Processes such as IEC 61508 or ED 109 or 
other standards/processes that give confidence 
of the integrity of the software i.e. It has been 
designed in a consistent and documented 
manner and infers some level of review. This 
gives confidence that the coding will be robust. 
These processes apply recommended levels of 
rigour that vary with the integrity requirement on 
the software being produced. 
 
10 
 
25 
 
30 
1. Certificate  of 
Conformance for the 
Product in question;
OR 
2. Independent Audit of 
conformance; 
OR 
3. Independent Audit of 
Justified Supplier 
Procedures. 
 
Note – Independent is 
independent of the product 
development / support team. 
Knowledge of internal design 
features which have been put in 
place to limit the possibility of 
unwanted system action 
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Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
Features in a system such as limiting the range 
on inputs to those expected or remove 
unwanted elements of an Operating System to 
ensure non-interference, greatly increase 
confidence that the system will not act 
abnormally. 
 
5 
 
10 
  Design Documentation 
supporting claimed features 
AND evidence of their 
efficacy.  
 
Note: If design features 
at software level are 
argued, then the RV 
Argument needs to 
include optional 
argument RV1.2 to 
demonstrate Traceability 
from the safety 
requirements to the 
features. 
Table J.4: Integrity assurance from design and development methods Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Table J.5: FUNCTIONAL Assurance 
Points  1 x 10
-5
Testing  Functional assurance requirements can be fully 
satisfied through testing alone 
IT IS MANDATORY TO ACHIEVE COVERAGE OF ALL 
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS THROUGH 
FAT OR SAT 
Specific Testing (Site Acceptance)  
F
u
l
l
 
T
e
s
t
 
 
  Evidence Satisfaction 
Criteria 
This testing is essentially designed to prove 
that the delivered system, after installation and 
commissioning, provides all of the required 
functionality.  
   
Specific Testing (Factory 
Acceptance) 
 
 
This testing is essentially designed to prove 
that the system, prior to leaving the factory, 
provides all of the required functionality. Often 
this can include tests that cannot be repeated 
on site, particularly where a test harness is 
required and measurements related to timing 
and processor loading are being made.  
100 
 
   
 
1. Test  Script. 
2. Test  Results. 
3. Traceability  matrix. 
 
Each functional Safety 
Requirement must be tested 
either during site or factory 
testing. 
Testing must include the 
extremes of conditions under 
which the system is expected 
to operate. 
Objective evidence of testing 
(and passing) of all functional 
Safety Requirements by 
providing traceability of Safety 
Requirement to test script to 
successful result. 
 
Note: These are the same 
criteria as those required to 
claim Integrity points from SAT 
and FAT. 
Table J.5 Functional assurance from 100% test coverage of functional Safety 
Requirements 
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ANNEX K RATIONALE 
K.1 Introduction 
SRG believes that full satisfaction of the objectives of SW 01 (Reference  1) 
cannot be achieved using evidence generated by most ANSPs’ current practices, 
but is achievable via several stages of increasing objectivity. These stages are 
identified in a Roadmap presented as Appendix L. The first stage is based on 
current practice and provides this Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC). The 
AMC is largely based on a subjective argument gleaned from the current 
practices of ANSPs. The Roadmap defines the goals for the AMC, with the aim to 
make it more objective over time and thus aligned with the objective approach of 
SW 01. The first Roadmap stage for the safety assurance of software in COTS 
equipment is defined in this guidance document. 
This Annex records the rationale for the first Roadmap stage.  
K.2  Interpretation of Risk Classification Schemes 
Risk classification schemes typically define “bands” or classes of risk tolerability 
(normally three or four classes) with the highest band representing unacceptable 
risk, the lowest band representing broadly acceptable risk and the intermediate 
band(s) representing risks that may be tolerable under certain conditions.  
The failure frequency of a Requirement is derived from a hazard/risk analysis and 
is set to be the acceptable rate of occurrence for a given hazard. If the rate of 
occurrence is such that the risk of the consequent accident is in the highest 
(unacceptable) risk class then a failure to meet the Requirement leads directly to 
failing to meet the target level of safety. 
In order to accommodate uncertainties both in the analysis of the hazards and in 
the development of the system, ANSPs should design systems to operate at a 
lower risk class, which normally means that the failure frequency of the 
Requirement will be lower than for the highest risk class, and is thus considered 
to be equivalently less risky (this assumes a linear relationship between risk and 
frequency). Consequently, some safety margin of risk is gained and this can be 
traded for the level of confidence needed that the Requirement is achieved 
(satisfied). Therefore, the necessary confidence level for demonstrating that the 
Requirement is achieved may be varied according to the risk class used when 
setting the Requirement. These confidence levels may be categorised as “Low” 
for the lowest risk class, “Medium” to “High” for intermediate risk classes and 
“Absolute” (which is impossible to achieve) for the highest risk class. In other 
words, the level of confidence that can be achieved when satisfying the reliability 
attributes of a Requirement primarily dictates the risk class. 
The following table illustrates this concept. In the example a function has to have 
a tolerable failure rate of 10
-8 at risk class A (where A is the highest risk class and 
D the lowest). Mitigations within the system reduce the necessary COTS failure 
rate to 10
-2. The table can then be used to decide which risk class is to be set 
based on the confidence that can be achieved i.e. if perfect confidence can be 
achieved then the target frequency is 10
-2 but if only low confidence can be 
achieved the target frequency is 10
-5. 
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Target Level of Safety / 
Risk Class 
A  B C D 
Accident rate  1 × 10
-8     
   mitigation @ 1000:1       
Gives a hazard rate of  1 × 10
-5 1  × 10
-6 1  × 10
-7 1  × 10
-8 
Further mitigation @ 
1000:1 
     
Gives a COTS requirement 
rate of 
1 × 10
-2 1  × 10
-3 1  × 10
-4 1  × 10
-5 
Confidence Category 
Required 
Absolute 
(impossible)
High Med Low 
Note:  In the above table, the figures are illustrative only and all rates are per 
hour. 
It is not generally possible to set objective levels of confidence for these 
subjective confidence categories, because the assumed relationship between 
risk, failure frequency and confidence cannot be objectively confirmed. However, 
DEF STAN 00-56 gives similar guidance with respect to high, medium and low 
levels of confidence in evidence. An extract from DEF STAN 00-56 Part 2 Annex 
C is reproduced below. 
C.1 General 
C.1.2 In setting safety integrity requirements and in assessing whether these are 
met, it is also necessary to consider that there is generally no absolute guarantee 
that a system meets such safety integrity requirements, only greater or lesser 
confidence that this is the case. In setting safety integrity requirements, it is 
therefore important to consider how much confidence is needed. The integrity 
requirement reflects the level of confidence there should be in the evidence. The 
higher the integrity requirement, the more confidence is needed in the evidence. 
C.1.3 Safety integrity requirements may include quantitative values for reliability, 
availability, robustness etc, together with the statistical (numerical) confidence 
with which these should be demonstrated to adequately support the safety 
argument. The required confidence can be achieved by a combination of 
statistical confidence and other forms of evidence (including qualitative evidence 
such as conformance to standards) that, combined with the quantified evidence 
allows a judgement of acceptability to be made. 
C.1.4 A qualitative categorisation scheme may be used for safety integrity 
requirements (for example see clause C.2), in which case high, medium or low 
safety integrity requirements (or some similar classification) are allocated to the 
system and its elements on the basis of the risk posed by the system and the 
contribution of the elements to the overall risk. 
… 
C.1.8. Even for the highest integrity systems, confidence is not the same as 
absolute proof. The reliability can be stated to be better than a certain value, to a 
stated statistical confidence and analyses and demonstration can show, to a 
level that might be judged convincing by expert practitioners, however, no 
argument can prove conclusively that failures can never occur. The level of 
confidence required in this Standard is that arguments and evidence should be 
compelling. When the confidence achieved is consistent with the safety integrity 
requirements, the evidence should be sufficient for the Safety Case and further Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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justification should not be needed. Table 3 provides guidance on the confidence 
that may be achieved with different forms of evidence.  
Extract from DEF STAN 00-56 Pt 2 Annex C Table 3 
Level of Confidence 
High Medium Low 
The highest level of 
confidence possible 
given the state of the 
art. The range of 
uncertainty 
(confidence) in the 
quantitative evidence 
claims should err on 
the side of pessimism.  
The effort expended on 
providing confidence 
should be proportionate to 
the risk. The range of 
uncertainty (confidence) in 
the quantitative evidence 
claims may err on the side 
of optimism (e.g. by up to 
1 order of magnitude).  
The range of 
uncertainty (confidence) 
in the quantitative 
evidence claims may err 
on the side of optimism 
(e.g. by up to 2 orders 
of magnitude).  
 
K.3  Requirement Refinement and Apportionment 
The proper form of Safety Requirements is discussed in paragraph 2.2 of this 
guidance. 
However, Safety Requirements are often set at a level that cannot be observed 
directly at the equipment’s interface with the rest of the system. For example, a 
common Safety Requirement is: “there shall be no credible corruption…”. In order 
for this Requirement to be satisfied the likely sources of credible corruption of the 
equipment concerned have to be identified e.g. accuracy, timeliness, 
completeness, freedom from additional artefacts. This process is a refinement of 
the functional part of the Requirement.  
However, it is not correct to just apportion the integrity part of a corruption 
Requirement to the refined Safety Requirements.  This is because the original 
analysis of the corruption Requirement was crude and will have used average or 
worst case considerations of mitigations and outcome (event) probabilities.   
Instead, each refined Safety Requirement identifies a specific type of failure (e.g. 
inaccuracy) against which some mitigations may be powerless, or extremely 
effective, and so each must be individually analysed to determine the acceptable 
rate of failure. 
Consequently, when properly formed Requirements are refined, not only does the 
functional part of the Requirement need to be refined, but the integrity part does 
as well, which will normally require the original integrity part to be apportioned to 
the refined Requirements. For example, to say that a piece of COTS equipment 
shall not corrupt a display is to say (in one case) that it will only deliver data that 
is to a certain accuracy. However, there can be no guarantee that it will never 
deliver inaccurate data and so a rate is used to define the integrity of the 
accuracy Requirement i.e. it shall only be inaccurate (beyond ±x%) once every 
10,000 hours – colloquially this is referred to as “accurate to 10
-4“. This level of 
visibility should always be provided and so full functional and integrity 
Requirements should be placed on the COTS equipment. A fuller explanation of 
refinement and apportionment can be found in paragraph 2.2 Step 1: Set valid 
Safety Requirements. 
Apportioning the Safety Requirement may have an impact on the testing 
approaches used by ANSPs. In general the apportioning of integrity is not Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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currently performed. Instead, the most onerous Safety Requirement is used to 
establish the test activities conducted e.g. the parameters of the integrity testing 
(usually a soak test). The test is then designed to demonstrate that the most 
onerous Requirement is met. It is assumed that since all other Requirements are 
less onerous, their success or failure will be demonstrated within the parameters 
established by the most onerous Requirement. This approach relies on the 
following argument: 
IF 
•  the equipment is tested over a period that would demonstrate 
that the most onerous Safety Requirement is met, and  
•  all input data values are presented with a probability 
distribution appropriate both for: 
o  the operational domain, and  
o  the creation of output data with a probability distribution 
also appropriate for the operational domain, 
THEN  
all less onerous Safety Requirements would have already 
been shown either to have been met or to have failed to be 
met. 
However, in practice the criteria given in the argument above are currently not 
met. For example: 
•  The most onerous integrity Requirement is not being identified, as 
apportionment of a Safety Requirement is not usually done correctly. Correct 
apportionment would usually yield refined equipment integrity Requirements 
that are more onerous than the most onerous Safety Requirement.  
•  In designing the test parameters to satisfy the most onerous Safety 
Requirement it is very unlikely that the full extent of the operational data 
domain will be examined and even less certain that the operational probability 
distribution will be replicated.  
•  Not all of the attributes of a functional Requirements are tested sufficiently, 
e.g. whilst sufficient tests for accuracy are executed, insufficient testing is 
carried out to demonstrate the timing attribute of the Requirements. 
This guidance sets limits of acceptability for the above approach. SRG considers 
this is acceptable for the first stage of the roadmap, but that a more objective 
approach to integrity testing will be needed in the future. 
 
K.4  The Division between 10
-4 and 10
-5 
SRG generally accepts that at some level of Requirement integrity, satisfaction 
can be shown solely from evidence of testing i.e. by treating the equipment as a 
“black box”. Beyond that, other forms of direct evidence are needed to augment 
the test evidence. These additional forms of direct evidence could come from 
knowledge of the design of the equipment or knowledge of previous use of the 
equipment (or both). Indirect forms of evidence such as knowledge of the Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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processes used and the reputation of the supplier can also increase confidence 
in making a claim that a Requirement had been satisfied. 
There is a significant body of academic work that suggests that the limit of 
testability is 1 × 10
-4 per hour. This is re-inforced by DEF STAN 00-56 interim 
version 3, which states in Part 2 Annex C: 
C1.6. Where quantified requirements are stringent (e.g. better than 10-4 failures 
per hour), it may be impracticable to demonstrate that these requirements are 
met by either examination, analysis, testing or operational experience alone to 
any meaningful statistical confidence. 
For this reason, the category of COTS equipment whose Requirements 
Satisfaction can be demonstrated solely by equipment-level evidence is 
colloquially called “10
-4 COTS equipment”.  
Therefore, for COTS equipment where the design is based on a low level of risk, 
which means that it is allowable to demonstrate satisfaction of an apportioned 
Safety Requirement with “low” confidence, the COTS equipment may be treated 
as a “black box” provided the Safety Requirement (at the equipment level) is no 
more onerous than 1  × 10
-4/h and the COTS equipment meets the testability 
criteria below (K.5). In such a case, it is not necessary to make an assurance 
argument specifically for the software within the COTS equipment because 
adequate confidence is demonstrated from equipment-level evidence. 
If it is not possible to demonstrate, with the required level of confidence, that a 
Safety Requirement has been satisfied at the black box level, then it is necessary 
to “open the box” (Of course it may be appropriate to open the box at any time if it 
is felt that this would help with the overall assurance argument). This is true of 
COTS equipment where a Safety Requirement has an integrity target of less than 
10
–4/hr or one that cannot meet the testability Requirements (see K.5 below). In 
general, for COTS equipment used in the airport environment, Requirements that 
cannot be demonstrated solely by testing are still no more onerous than 
1 × 10
-5/h. For this reason equipment falling into this category is colloquially 
called “10
-5 COTS equipment”.  
In order to “open the box” it is necessary to have an appropriate relationship with 
the COTS equipment supplier to have access to design documentation. 
The design information will allow further apportionment of the Safety 
Requirements to be performed allocating the COTS Equipment Safety 
Requirements to the relevant architectural components, i.e. the hardware and 
software. This will need to be performed in conjunction with the COTS equipment 
supplier. 
If, as will almost always be the case, this further apportionment results in some 
element of the equipment Safety Requirement being allocated to the software 
within the COTS equipment, then it will be necessary to produce a software 
assurance argument. This software assurance argument is required to bolster the 
level of confidence that has been achieved through black box testing, to a point 
where it can be argued with the appropriate level of confidence that the Safety 
Requirement has been satisfied. 
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K.5 Testability 
The testability of a ‘black box’ does not depend only on the value of the failure 
rate of the requirement being demonstrated, it depends also on: 
•  the attribute of the Requirement being observable at the equipment boundary 
(e.g. via displays, alarms, external test equipment); 
•  all output states, that need to be tested, being stimulated only by action at the 
inputs of the equipment; and  
•  sufficient of the state space being exercised. 
NOTE:  The state space of an equipment is the set of internal logical states that 
it can assume; the concept of state space is particularly relevant to 
software.  
This may be established from knowledge of the extent of:  
•  the input domain;  
•  the output domain; and  
•  the internal variables.  
It is important to understand the extent of the internal variables, since if the 
equipment has persistent memory, as is usually the case with software based 
equipment, then its contribution to the state space will be very large (if not near-
infinite). 
The claim for testability is built into the CAE diagram for Requirements 
Satisfaction (see AMC, paragraph K.6, below) and this claim must be satisfied as 
well as the claim that testing has shown that the Requirement has been met, 
before the Requirements Satisfaction claim can be properly substantiated. 
The testability of equipment also encompasses the notion that all the equipment’s 
Requirements can be tested. The arguments provided in the guidance are for the 
satisfaction of a single Requirement.  Usually, an equipment has to satisfy many 
(multiple) Requirements (only some being Safety Requirements) and the 
implementation tries to ensure they all are satisfied collectively i.e. without 
interfering with one another. 
It is straightforward to argue that demonstrating satisfaction of multiple 
Requirements can be achieved by repeating the argument (provided in the 
guidance material) for a single Requirement, a number of times. This is not so for 
arguing about the collective satisfaction of the Requirements. Primarily this is 
because the collective argument depends upon the state space of the 
implementation (the equipment). A large number of Requirements usually mean 
an extensive input domain, an extensive output domain and an extensive domain 
for the internal variables. Thus in this instance the state space will be extremely 
large. Even if there are few input and output variables, the complexity indicated 
by the large number of Requirements (or a small number of complex 
Requirements) would indicate a large state space due to internal variables. Note 
the assumption that complexity can be related to state space. In general this may 
be valid but there are many exceptions, for example a recursive solution to a 
problem is structurally simple but creates an enormous state space. Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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Without knowledge of the size of the state space or a surrogate such as the 
complexity of the implementation there can be no assurance that testing has 
shown Requirements Satisfaction. There is no direct measure of state space and 
the complexity surrogate poses something of a paradox when trying to deal with 
a black box, where, supposedly, nothing is known about the box’s internal 
features. In order to move forward SRG has taken the view that this issue would 
be resolved at some later stage of the roadmap subject to increased vigilance on 
the introduction of new equipment that satisfy the conditions for use of the AMC. 
K.6 The  AMC 
Evidence that is generally available today, together with other evidence that 
should be readily available, form the baseline defined as Stage 1 of the roadmap 
and the basis of the AMC for all SW 01 sub-objectives. Generic arguments have 
been derived for both “10
-4” and “10
-5” COTS equipment and are reproduced in 
this guidance document. 
However, for Requirements Satisfaction, the sufficiency of the varying types of 
evidence is unclear and so the AMC defines acceptable direct and indirect 
sources of Requirements Satisfaction evidence in two ways: 
•  as the lowest level leaves of the Claims – Arguments - Evidence (CAE) 
diagrams; and 
•  as a table (the “COTS Evidence Evaluation Table“ (CEET) in Annexes 
I  and  J) that relates sources of evidence to a notional value of their 
contribution to the Requirements Satisfaction goal. 
The significant aspect of the Requirements Satisfaction argument is that a 
method is provided for combining evidence of different types (Test, Field Service, 
Design, Process, Supplier credibility) to provide a claim that the Requirements 
have been satisfied.  
In the CEET the various Requirements Satisfaction evidence items have been 
assigned a weighting based upon experience such that acceptable combinations 
of evidence result in a total of 100 points. The CEET only needs to address 
Requirements Satisfaction evidence, as the evidence required for the other 
SW 01 objectives does not need to be combined in varying ways. Dependent 
upon the evidence available and the integrity assurance points associated with 
the evidence, individual arguments may differ for specific Safety Requirements. 
However, there is the potential to group together Safety Requirements of a 
similar type and safety significance.  
Two aspects of the AMC will need future improvement: 
•  The weightings in the current scheme for combining the sources of evidence 
are subjective. The scheme needs to be made fully objective but may need 
several steps to become so. 
•  The assessment of the evidence itself (the points allocated for a particular 
piece of evidence) is subjective and based upon good practice as of 2005. It 
too needs to be made fully objective over a number of steps. 
The opportunities for improvement in the future have been identified and 
assigned as stages in the implementation of the roadmap (a defined way forward 
from the current baseline to a future level of assurance) – see Annex L. The 
improvements will provide more detail of the evidence, allow more kinds of Guidance for Producing SW 01 Safety Arguments for COTS Equipment 
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evidence and allow the arguments to become more objective. Consequently, 
while the top-level structure of the guidance’s CAE diagrams is viewed by SRG 
as being stable, as work progresses (during the various stages of the roadmap) it 
is expected that lower levels may be added and the arguments changed. It will 
have an impact on the CEET, as there is a direct relationship between the 
example arguments and the integrity assurance points available. However, it is 
likely that: 
•  the headings will remain but the contents of the CEET will change to reflect 
the added detail of the CAE diagrams;  
•  the assurance points will change to reflect more objective ways of combining 
the evidence (the arguments) and to associate assurance points with more 
detailed evidence; and 
•  the total number of assurance points required for the acceptance of a safety 
case may alter to reflect more objective views of the assurance required. 
The CEET considers satisfaction of a single Safety Requirement. It is current 
practice to assume that although there may be several Safety Requirements for a 
piece of COTS equipment, they do not interfere with one another. The arguments 
in the AMC provide a framework for the satisfaction of multiple Safety 
Requirements. Consequently, at stage 1 of the roadmap, evidence that satisfies 
the CEET for each Safety Requirement is all that is required i.e. the CEET can be 
applied to each Requirement individually, or to each convenient group of 
Requirements.  
In order to address the interference effects (collective satisfaction of Safety 
Requirements) of implementing several Requirements in a single architectural 
unit, the notion of the state space of the implementation needs to be used. While 
objectives for the input and output domains of the state space have been 
identified, albeit subjectively, the expansion of this notion into the internal variable 
domain has been deferred for this stage of the roadmap.  
It is expected that over time, the AMC will be validated through use and refined in 
the light of experience. 
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ANNEX L  ROADMAP 
This Annex contains the outline Roadmap for the further development of this Guidance. It 
should be noted that this Roadmap might be influenced by subsequent findings by SRG 
when addressing non-COTS systems. 
  Stage 1  Stage 2  …  Stage n 
 Summary 
Introduction of Goal 
Based Regulation 
and creation of 'level 
playing field' across 
industry 
Safety arguments 
made more robust by 
placing less reliance 
on subjective 
evidence, still based 
solely on adherence 
to the scheme 
… 
Full compliance with 
SES legislation i.e. 
ESARR 6 transposed 
in the Common 
Requirements 
 Schedule  2008 to 2010  2010  …  TBD 
Transition 
Required 
From an argument of 
‘following a process 
should make a safe 
product‘ to one of 
‘argument 
incorporating 
evidence in 
accordance with 
Guidance‘ 
From ‘argument 
incorporating 
evidence in 
accordance with 
Guidance‘ to one of 
‘diverse evidence 
shows the product is 
acceptably safe‘ 
… 
To full compliance 
with Single European 
Sky (SES) legislation 
- the software is 
tolerably safe 
Safety 
Rationale 
Introduction of 
structured 
arguments 
supported by 
evidence in a 
consistent 
repeatable manner- 
Encourages 
requirements with a 
complete set of 
safety attributes 
As for Stage 1 except 
argument provided 
by the CAE diagrams 
is more objective - 
Requires 
requirements with a 
complete set of 
safety attributes 
… 
Full compliance e.g. 
arguments include 
the use of 
quantitative evidence 
for integrity claims 
Supporting 
Evidence  
Minimum acceptable 
standard of evidence 
defined 
Evidence becomes 
more objective and 
quantitative (to 
support modifications 
in evaluation 
scheme) 
… 
Evidence dominated 
by quantitative rather 
than qualitative 
evidence 
Evaluation 
scheme 
Implementation of 
1 x 10
-4 and 1 x 10
-5 
evaluation schemes 
(CEET including 
evidence criteria) 
Evaluation scheme 
modified in line with 
more objective 
assessment of the 
combination of 
evidence 
…  Scheme fully 
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Regulatory 
Safety 
Assessment 
Regime 
Assessment 
(validate the 
evidence and 
argument) of 
compliance with 
scheme 
Assessment of 
argument and 
evidence 
…  Objective 
assessment 
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ANNEX M  CHECKING AID 
This checking aid is provided to assist ANSPs and assessors when preparing the 
submission and verifying whether the submission complies with this guidance. ANSPs may 
wish to complete this checking aid and include it in the submission to support their claim of 
compliance.  
Section/ 
Page  Item  Compliance 
2.2 
p8 
The Safety requirements were set according to the 
ANSP’s Safety Management System (not that of 
another ANSP or of a contractor). 
 
2.2 
p8 
The Safety requirements have been apportioned 
according to system architecture and available 
mitigations, down to COTS equipment level. 
 
2.2.1 
p9 
The COTS equipment safety requirements are 
properly formed.  
 
2.3 
p10 
The COTS item is an equipment.  The guidance is not 
valid, and may not be used, for COTS software. 
 
2.3 
p10 
The COTS equipment specification is sufficiently 
detailed to demonstrate implementation of the system 
safety requirements. 
 
2.3 
p10 
The most onerous integrity requirement on an 
individual COTS equipment is no worse than 1 x 10
-5. 
 
2.3 
p10 
Equipment monitoring requirements are specified in 
the associated System Safety Case (from the time that 
the COTS equipment enters service). 
 
2.3, RS1 
p10 
p24  
 
If the submission covers multiple equipments, they 
must be shown to be identical (hardware and 
software). [10
-4 only] 
(Note that for 10
-5, the ANSP could choose to address 
this issue as part of the Configuration Consistency 
argument, or in introductory material.) 
 
2.3, 
RS1.1.1 
p10, 
p26, 46 
The Safety Objectives must have been set at a 
‘broadly acceptable’ level. 
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Section/ 
Page  Item  Compliance 
2.3, 
RS1.1.2 
p11,  
p26, 46 
The Safety Requirements are all expressed in terms of 
the COTS equipment outputs. 
 
2.3, 
RS1.1.3 
p11,  
p26, 46 
The behaviour specified by the COTS Equipment 
Safety Requirements can be stimulated using the 
equipment inputs and the available test facilities. 
 
2.4 
p11 
The ANSP has presented the textual argument (not 
just the evidence) that the objectives of SW 01 have 
been met.  Graphical representation of the argument is 
optional. 
 
2.4 
p11 
The arguments and optional diagrams have been 
tailored to cover variations in the evidence actually 
provided to support the arguments.   
 
2.4 
p11 
Text in italics in the template arguments has not been 
included in the software safety submission.   
 
2.5 
p12 
Specific references have been embedded in the 
arguments for all evidence required to support and 
justify the arguments. 
 
2.5 
p12 
The evidence used has been examined when 
preparing the submission to ensure it is suitable. 
 
2.5 
p12 
The ANSP has access to the evidence.   
2.5, RS1.2 
p12 
p29, 49 
Where evidence items are those defined in the CEET, 
they satisfy relevant Evidence Satisfaction Criteria in 
the CEET. 
 
2.5 
p12 
 
Each evidence item has been checked to identify 
whether it is immediately obvious that the evidence 
supports the arguments.  If necessary, explanations or 
arguments to show this have been added. 
 
2.6 & 
2.7.2  
p12, 13 
A score of 100 assurance points or more has been 
accumulated from the Integrity Assurance CEET and a 
further 100 assurance points has been accumulated 
from the Functional Assurance CEET. 
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Section/ 
Page  Item  Compliance 
2.8 
p13 
It has been claimed that the guidance has been 
complied with. Assurance is given that the AMC has 
only been modified in those areas permitted by the 
guidance. 
 
2.8, RS1.2 
p13 
p29, 49 
Explanations are given of how the ANSP has chosen 
to present the arguments, e.g. with respect to the 
satisfaction of multiple groups of safety requirements. 
 
Footnote 
5 
p23  
The System Safety Assessment has addressed all of 
the behaviour exhibited by the COTS Equipment 
including un-specified behaviour. [10
-4 only, as 10
-5 has 
more detailed argument] 
 
RS1.1.4 
p27, 47 
‘Initial Monitoring Instructions’ attempt to detect and 
record any behaviour that is not specified in the COTS 
Equipment Specification. 
 
RS1.2 
p28, 48 
The ANSP agrees that the assurance provided by 
evaluation of the COTS equipment, using this scheme, 
is sufficient. The argument is not invalidated by 
contrary evidence or other circumstances. 
 
RS1.2 
p29, 49 
The evidence provided for the arguments RS1.2 and 
below is credible for each Safety Requirement. (An 
example of incredible evidence might be field-service 
evidence where certain features of a product relevant 
to some Safety Requirements have not been 
exercised)  
 
RS1.2 
p29, 49 
The arguments (RS1.2 and below) show the evidence 
relevant to each Safety Requirement in a manner that 
facilitates review and audit. For example, traceability 
mechanisms show the relevant tests and test records 
for each Safety Requirement. 
 
RS1.2.2, 
RS1.2.3, 
RS1.2.4 
p32, 53, 
p33, 54, 
p35, 56 
COTS equipment specific arguments have been 
completed where necessary. (The template has not 
fully detailed these arguments) 
 
RV1 
p37 
Safety requirements derived from un-required 
behaviour of the COTS equipment were apportioned, 
in the system safety analyses to appropriate system 
components.  
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Section/ 
Page  Item  Compliance 
RV1 
p37 (see 
footnote 
16) 
If derived safety requirements were allocated to parts 
of the system other than the COTS equipment, further 
safety arguments are provided to address these safety 
requirements to support putting the COTS equipment 
into service. 
 
RV1 
p37 
The product specification is of adequate quality such 
that an analysis of all specified behaviour of the COTS 
equipment was satisfactorily completed. 
 
CC1.3 
p42, 43 
COTS equipment specific arguments have been 
completed where necessary.  (The template has not 
fully detailed these arguments) 
 
NI 
p61, 62 
COTS equipment specific arguments have been 
completed where necessary.  (The template has not 
fully detailed these arguments) 
 
CEET 
p65, 74 
FAT or SAT evidence has been used.   
CEET 
p65, 74 
ANSP Soak Testing or Supplier Testing evidence has 
been used. 
 
CEET 
p65, 74 
A maximum of 90/75 (10
-4/10
-5) integrity assurance 
points have been claimed for testing. 
 
CEET 
p65, 74 
Assurance points have not been claimed when 
satisfaction criteria are not completely met. 
 
CEET 
p67, 76 
A maximum of one item from Field service experience 
is claimed. 
 
CEET 
p70, 78 
A maximum of 20 integrity assurance points have been 
claimed for supplier experience and expertise. 
 
CEET 
p71, 79 
A maximum of 30 integrity assurance points have been 
claimed for supplier software design/development.  
(See RV1.2 on p39). 
 
CEET 
p71, 79 
If design features at software level are argued, then 
arguments are presented showing Traceability from 
the requirements to the features. 
 
CEET 
p72, 80 
All functional safety requirements are covered by FAT 
or SAT. 
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General Checks  
Section/ 
Page  Item  Compliance 
  The submission is of a suitable general quality. For 
example: document identification and version control, 
authorisation, absence of spelling and typographic 
errors, absence of TBAs, work is complete, tailoring to 
specific application, general presentation. 
 
  Arguments are based on the templates in the 
Guidance, and reflect the explanations given of how 
the ANSP has chosen to present the arguments. See 
2.8 (p13), RS1.2 (p29, 49). 
Compliance with the Guidance cannot be claimed if 
the template arguments are altered other than as 
permitted in the Guidance. 
 
  Evidence (or references to evidence) has been 
provided in every case that the argument invokes 
evidence, and that evidence exists. 
 
  The evidence is relevant to the application.     
  The actual evidence correctly exhibits the necessary 
characteristics to support each argument that invokes 
it.  For example, test results shows that the right things 
were tested and passed the test. 
 
  Evidence is of a suitable general quality to support a 
safety submission. 
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